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I. INTRODUCTION
The findings of the recently issued Military Health Care Study
(MHCS) suggest that the delivery of health services in the Military
Health Services System (MHSS) is less than. optimally efficient and thus
not cost-effective in selected areas. Among the findings leading to this
conclusion were: (1), the existence of perverse incentives associated
with the historical workload budgeting process; (2), the non-realization
of the full potential of Tri-Service regionalization; and (3), the lack of
coordination in the management of selected highly specialized (tertiary)
care. The study concludes that there exist a number of opportunities
to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the MHSS while maintaining
a high level of quality care. Against this background, the study sug-
gests a number of changes in current DOD policies as well as MHSS
organization. The proposed changes were set forth in nine recom-
mendations which ". . . were constructed as broad concepts of manage-
ment and organization. . . "
It is believed that the main thrust of the recommendation seem to
focus on the concepts of regionalized health services and the companion
issue of decentralization (the delegation of decision- making authority
and planning to lower levels of management). To evaluate this belief,
it was decided to examine the management issues related to decentral-
ization in the literature (Part II) and to pursue a more thorough analysis

of the relevant questions surrounding those recommendations (of the
MHCS) that are believed to have a significant bearing on the issues at
hand, (regionalization/ decentralization).
Part III deals with the regional management structure of the MHSS.
Consideration is first given to the current structures; then, to the
alternatives set forth in the MHCS, namely recommendation 3 -
"Oversight of health care delivery operations should be assigned to
regional authorities responsible for all health care delivery in their
CONUS geographical areas. " Consideration is then given to developing
what is believed to be an "ideal" regional management structure. A
regional health planning agency emerges as a necessary support agency
for the posited regional authority: its role relative to the posited
regional authority and the already existing regional medical center/
facilities is then explained. In Part IV, the salient features of the
research efforts are brought together in a concluding analysis.

II. THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALIZATION
A. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND DEFINITION
Decentralization is defined in Webster's Third International
Dictionary as the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers
from a central authority to regional and local bodies. Notwithstanding
this definition, the concept of decentralized management may trigger
vastly different notions about its meaning. Currently, much is heard
about the merits of decentralization as a concept of management. A
close examination of the arguments being debated among organizational
theorists might lead one to the conclusion that it is simply the locus of
decision-making and planning authority within complex organizations
which is of major concern. From this inference the following questions
might arise; what is the appropriate management structure i. e.
,
should
management control through decision-making authority and planning be
centralized at top management levels, or should such authority and
planning be delegated to lower management levels? To be sure, there
appears to be no quick and easy answer to such questions.
Thompson suggests that under conditions of complexity, when major
organizational units are reciprocally interdependent, such units will
likely be so arranged as to provide self-sufficiency within their respec-
tive environments. [Thompson, p. 76] To extend this theme further,
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the research of Lawrence and Lorsch provided the basis of a contingency
theory of organization in which they regard the optimal organizational
structure as being contingent upon the organization's environmental
factors. It is suggested that decentralization under stable environmental
conditions and centralization under dynamic environmental conditions
may be dysfunctional, i. e. , they argue that an organization must estab-
lish a "fit" between its internal structural arrangement and its environ-
mental demands. [Lawrence and Lorsch, p. 156-158]
The work of Lawrence and Lorsch appears to be substantiated by
the findings of Negandhi and Reimann. They sought to provide further
insight relative to the impact of other environmental factors on organiza-
tional structure, i. e.
,
their investigation sought to explore the impact
of decentralization an organizational effectiveness. The results of this
research revealed that under relatively competitive market conditions,
decentralized firms were more likely to be more effective than central-
ized firms. [Negandhi and Reimann, p. 91-94]
Spearman's rank correlation was
. . . used to
examine the relationships between the decentral-
ization and organizational effectiveness indices.
The correlation coefficient between decentraliza-
tion and the behavioral measures of effectiveness
was 0. 89 . • •
Translated into actual managerial practices, our
findings suggest that firms having greater concern
for task environmental agents (i. e.
,
firms viewing
their task agents in long-term perspectives) are
likely to have fewer layers of hierarchy in their
organizational structures. They opt for the
consultative type of decision making regarding
11

major policies, sales, product mix, produc-
tion, standard-setting, manpower policies,
executive selection, and long-range planning.
On the other hand, firms viewing their task
environment in short-term perspectives are likely
to have more layers' of hierarchy and the chief
executive or owner is probably making all deci-
sions regarding functional areas a.nd major
policies. The results also show that the de-
centralized firms are more effective in both
behavioral and economic terms.
[Negandhi and Reimann, p. 147]
Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the Board at General Electric, one of
the pioneer companies in decentralized management suggests that a
company should assess its environment and itself relative to that
environment and thus select an appropriate organizational structure
suited to itself:
If I have any thesis, it is that each company
should study, for itself, the particular con-
ditions that will determine its future, and out
of such detailed study should evolve a philos-
ophy and structure that is fully appropriate
for an individual company. [Cordiner, p. 41]
Regarding decentralization as a philosophy of management, William
T. Jerome, III, provides the following observation:
. . . Decentralization is a way to keep respon-
sible managers close to the seat of operations,
making it possible to speed up actions, to
simplify communications, to maximize pro-
cedural formalities - in short to let managers
manage. To create such an environment, cer-
tain prerogatives of authority and responsibility
must be effectively delegated. In other words,
under any decentralized forms of organization,
managers must be given not only the discretionary
funds (or equivalent resources) commensurate
with the job to be done but also the opportunity to
help plan what is done. [Jerome, p. 122]
12

' Peter Drucker, in his evaluation of General Motors as a big business
corporation, suggested that General Motors has become an "essay in
federalism" and further states that under the leadership of Alfred P.
Sloan (Chairman of the Corporation) the concept of decentralization has
been developed ". . . into a philosophy of industrial management and into
a system of self government. It is not merely a technique of manage-
ment but an outline of a social order. " The aims of decentralization at
General Motors, i.e., its preceived advantages, are summarized by
Drucker as follows:
1. The speed with which a decision can be made,
the lack of any confusion as to who makes it and
the knowledge of the policies on which the decision
is based by everybody concerned.
2. The absence of any conflict between the interests
of the divisions and those of General Motors.
3. The sense of fairness in dealing among exec-
utives, the certainty that a good job will be ap-
preciated, the confidence and feeling of security
that comes when personality-issues, intrigues
and factionalism are kept under control.
4. The democracy of management and its
informality. Nobody throws his weight around,
yet there is never any doubt where the real
authority lies. Everybody is free to criticize,
to talk and to suggest; yet once the decision is
taken, nobody tries to sabotage it.
5. The absence of a gap in the executive group
between the "privileged few" and the "great
many. " "Mr. Wilson (the President) could not
arrogate to himself any right he does not accord
to his associates. "
13

6. There is a very large management group.
Thus there is always a supply of good and
experienced leaders, able to take top
responsibility.
7. Decentralization means that weak divisions
and weak managers cannot ride for any length
of time on the coat tails of successful divisions,
or trade on their own past reputation.
8. Decentralization means the absence of
"edict management" in which nobody quite
knows why he does what he is ordered to do.
Its place is taken by discussion and by policies
which are public and which are arrived at as a
result of the experiences of all the people
concerned. [Drucker, p. 135-6]
Cordiner further suggested that the most important aspect of G. E. 's
philosophy of management is through the decentralization of responsibility
and authority for making business decisions. [Cordiner, p. 47] He
summarizes the thinking of top management at General Electric by setting
forth ten principles which are strikingly similar to the advantages (at
General Motors) cited by Drucker.
Since philosophy is, by definition a system
of first principles, I should like to list for
you ten principles which express General
Electric's philosophy of decentralization:
1. Decentralization places authority to
make decisions at points as near as possible
to where actions take place.
2. Decentralization is likely to get best
over-all results by getting greatest and most
directly applicable knowledge and most timely
understanding actually into play on the great-
est number of decisions.
14

3. Decentralization will work if real authority-
is delegated; and not if details then have to be
reported, or, worse yet, if they have to be
"checked" first.
4. Decentralization requires confidence that
associates in decentralized positions will have
the capacity to make sound decisions in the
majority of cases; and such confidence starts
at the executive level. Unless the President
and all the other Officers have a deep personal
conviction and an active desire to decentralize
full decision-making responsibility and authority,
actual decentralization will never take place. The
Officers must set an example in the art of full
delegation.
5. Decentralization requires understanding that
the main role of staff or services is the render-
ing of assistance and advice to line operators
through a relatively few experienced people, so
that those making decisions can themselves make
them correctly.
6. Decentralization requires the realization that
the natural aggregate of many individually sound
decisions will be better for the business than
controlled decisions.
7. Decentralization rests on the need to have
general business objectives, organization struc-
ture, relationships, policies, and measurements
known, understood, and followed; but realizing
that definition of policies does not necessarily
mean uniformity of methods of executing such
policies in decentralized operations.
8. Decentralization can be achieved only when
higher executives realize that authority genuinely
delegated to lower echelons cannot, in fact, also
be retained by them. We have, today, Officers
and Managers who still believe in decentralization
down to themselves and no further. By paying lip-
service to decentralization, but actually reviewing
detailed work and decisions and continually "second-
guessing" their associates, such Officers keep their




9. Decentralization will work only if respon-
sibility commensurate with decision-making
authority is truly accepted and exercised at
all levels.
10. Decentralization requires personnel
policies based on measured performance,
enforced standards, rewards for good per-
formance, and removal for incapacity or
poor performance. [Cordiner, p. 51-2]
Notwithstanding the perceived advantage/benefits of decentralization
its implementation may not be without disadvantages /problems depending
on the viewer's perspective. In this regard Lorsch suggested the follow-
ing while noting the contributions of Cordiner and Sloan:
Let me be clear - some of this activity is well
thought out and has even been well documented
(e. g. , Cordiner's account of the organization
change at General Electric and Sloan's even
more comprehensive statement of his experience
at General Motors) . . . But in many companies
there has been a tendency to follow the trend set
by such major companies without any careful
thought to whether what General Motors . . .
does is appropriate for that company.
[Lorsch, p. 157]
George A. Smith, in his work dealing with geographically decentral-
ized companies which cover a period spanning approximately 20 years,
analyzed the problem of such companies and as a result suggests that
problems associated with decentralization may be listed in two categories
(1) "hard or impossible to solve, " and (2) problems "that can be sub-
stantially overcome. " The former category is defined as:




2. Jockeying for power (headquarters officers
versus local officers).
3. Disagreeing over basic organizational
arrangements
.
4. Belief that the "other level" is not doing
its part.
5. Resistance to changed status relationships.
6. Tendency of people at each level to over-
step prescribed bounds.
7. Fear of being judged unfairly in the absence
of clear standards.
8. Impossibility of finding a common mold
into which all local units will fit.
9. Resentments that occur when men are
transferred between regions, and between
regions and headquarters.
[Smith, p. 106]
Smith further suggests that problems of the latter category are quite
substantial in number; in the interest of brevity eight such problems
are listed:
1. Arousing needless fears or false
expectations through poor communication.
2. Confused organizational planning.
3. Talking and acting in contradictory ways.
4. Blaming people when administrative
arrangements are at fault.
5. Expecting people to adjust quickly to
new status relationships.
6. Expecting people to play conflicting roles.
17

7. Refusing to alter arrangements to fit people,
or to fit new circumstances.




The review of the literature suggests that changing from a highly-
centralized to a decentralized organizational structure provides a
formidable challenge to the executive group. If it can be assumed, for
example, that the changes in organizational structure occur in order
to enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness, it then follows that
there must exist endogenous incentives for executive management to
provide the necessary requisites for successful change implementation,,
(the aforementioned incentives are believed to be implicit if not ex-
plicitly set forth in both the respective summaries of Drucker and
Cordiner relative to the decentralization aims of General Motors and
General Electric cited here).
Smith suggests that managers in their efforts to explain change
should be careful to avoid references to a decentralized program per se
because of three misleading implications: (1) that it (decentralization)
will start and therefore be completed at a definite point in time, (2) that
all the intended changes in authority will result in downward delegation,
and (3) that the program can in some way be separated from the everyday
routine of the company or firm. [Smith, p. 20] Jerome, by contrast,




To the manager, change invariably complicates the
conduct of operations for which he has responsibility.
This is ironic in that change is the stuff from which
progress comes. Therefore, the manager is left
with two alternatives: to suppress or discourage
change or to create the sort of environment in which
change can take place with the minimum disruption.
In brief, a manager must be able to coordinate
diverse influences and activities if he is to control
these rather than be controlled.
[Jerome, p. 4]
The work of Lawrence and Lorsch further suggests the fact that a
complex organizational structure operating in a dynamic environment is
more likely to be highly differentiated, requiring a great degree of
integration. It is suggested that successful conflict resolution plays an
ever increasing role in such organizational structures.
How well the organization will succeed in achiev-
ing integration, therefore, depends to a great
extent upon how the individuals resolve their
conflict. Our work indicates that the conflict
resolution varies in some respects depending
upon environmental demands . . .
[Lawrence and Lorsch, Developing
. . .
, p. 3]
Their studies further indicated that the formality of a unit's structure
was related to the relative certainty of that unit's environment. "Organi.
zations or organizational units operating in dynamic environmental con-
dition tended to be decentralized while those facing stable environments
were relatively centralized. " [Lawrence and Lorsch, op. cit. ]
A further review of the literature suggests that decentralization
efforts have not been limited to the private sector. Within the public
sector, decentralized management is evident in such organizations as
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the Federal Reserve System, the TVA, and U.S. Forest Service. In
the health care sector, Thomas suggests that enthusiastic advocates of
decentralization can be found more recently among mental health admin-
istrators. [Thomas and Hilleboe, p. 1622] The works of Kaufman and
Purdom provide what is recognized as well documented case studies of
the decentralization efforts within the New York City Department of
Health and the Philadelphia Public Health Department respectively. The
former is complemented by the more recent work of Mustalish, et al.
In both decentralization efforts, however, the aim was to affect a trans-
fer of power from the central bureau to the district manager, i. e. , to
delegate decision-making authority and responsibility to the district level.
B. MODELS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
1. New York City Department of Health
Efforts to decentralize the New York City Department of Health
predates World War I. Herbert Kaufman's study, covering a period in
excess of forty years (up to 1958), provides a thorough analysis of the
organizational changes that were affected. Attempts at decentralization
were incremental over the forty year period and generally accepted as
being unsuccessful, i. e.
,
a decentralization effort that resulted in a
transfer of power from the Central bureau to the field manager did not
result. Decision-making authority remained at the bureau level.




1. The tradition of distinguished authoritative
bureau directors who set program policy;
2. Professional rapport between the Central
Office Specialists and Field Specialists;
3. Ease of communication between the bureau
officials and district staff;
4. Lack of local public interest constituencies
to support the district health officer; and
5. Departmental policy that technical matters
were within the bureau's area of expertise.
[Kaufman, 1959]
In a more recent study Dr. Anthony C. Mustalish, (Deputy Commissioner,
New York City Department of Health) et al. , suggested that the changes
in organizational structure which ultimately contributed toward another
shift of emphasis from the central bureau to field directors (between
1966 and 1971) can be attributed to the following factors in favor of
decentralization:
1. National legislation for supporting local
program;
2. City administrative reorganization;
3. Resurgence of community activism and
participation in health services;
4. Community demands for improving health
services; and





Mustalish further suggested that as a result of the Piel Com-
mission's recommendations (1967), a city "super agency, " the Health
Services Administration, (HSA) was established which was given respon-
sibility for the total delivery of health care service, i. e. , Department
of Health, Department of Hospitals, Department of Mental Health, and
the Medical Examiner's Office. It was anticipated that the efforts of
the HSA would result in improved planning as well as the administration
of municipal Health Services. Directed in the first three years of its
existence by physician administrators, in 1970 the first non-physician
administrator was appointed to head the HSA. Mustalish reports that
the agency was staffed by a large number of planners and analysts, and
subsequently developed into planning, productivity and management-
oriented agency. It was suggested that as a result of the existence and
function of the HSA, the authority of the Commissioner of Health and
bureau chiefs were reduced, [ibid., p. 1151]
As a result of a subsequent program, policy, and service
review by a commissioner of health, "... a plan for administrative
decentralization of personal health services was outlined that redefined
the roles of bureaus and districts and included transfer of budgetary
authority from local services to district, assignment of district health
managers, and the implementation of a district cost accounting system. "
[ibid] During the same period (between 1972 and 1975) an executive
order was issued requiring bureau directors to submit for discussion
22

a list of functions over which the bureau should retain control citing
the justification therefor. Mustalish suggests that ". . . the impetus
for decentralization came from a recognition of the complexity of a
metropolis such as New York City, the changing focus of public health,
and the need to provide an integrated broad spectrum of specific health
services to communities." [Mustalish, p. 1150]
Organizational initiatives were put forth to strengthen the health
services organizational structure.
Lines of communication were established between
the commissioner and the district health officers.
A formal channel of communication was created
through the formation of the Health Officers Ad-
visory Committee which met periodically with
the Commissioner. The committee worked with
bureau directors in establishing policies that
were to be implemented in the district.
[Ibid.]
It is significant to note that while the bureau structure was
revised to permit "decentralization" there appeared to be no significant
change in the administrative structure at the district level. Notwith-
standing the foregoing observation, a district reporting and accounting
system was introduced that provided clinic utilization and unit cost data
on a decentralized basis by district. In addition a program budgeting
system was established that gave the district for the first time input
to the resource allocations. Mustalish reports that purchasing of




Reorganization of Department activities was evident by the
fall of 1973.
Health Officers and managers had authority and
accountability for operations in their respective
districts. Personnel functions, purchasing and
budgeting, and program administration were now
largely local functions. Bureau activity for dis-
trict health operations was predominantly advisory,
consultative and evaluative. There were, however,
problems with this new structure: (1) the direct
communication between the First Deputy's office
and the 16 health officers and 22 managers was a
logistical nightmare; (2) lines of decision-making
between the district health officer and the manager
were unclear.
[Ibid.]
November 1973 signaled the creation by executive order of six
regions throughout the city headed by a regional health director. "The
regional health director replaced the borough health director's position
that was established in 1954. " His reporting authority was the first
Deputy Commissioner. Each director was assigned two health officers
and four managers. "The managers had operational responsibility for
the district activities. " The health officers functioned as staff to the
regional director on program planning and evaluation, [ibid. ]
The present status of the Department relative to its organizational
structure is reflected in the following statement:
. . . district operations - as in previous
administrations - reverted to being directed
by the Deputy Commissioner. Regionaliza-
tion was retained and strengthened. Managers
remained responsible for administering the
services of the district. Managers now report,
however, to health officers who in turn report
to regional director. [ibid 1
24

In the concluding discussion, Mustalish considers whether or
not the present "New York City organization" is indicative of a decentral-
ization of decision- making. He suggests that "the reorganization has not
changed the locus of decision- making affecting the local communities on
the central field axis. " The following summary of the decentralization
efforts are provided:
A reorganization of the New York City Depart-
ment of Health has occurred under the banner
of decentralization. Local managers were
introduced into the health districts and together
with the health officers assigned responsibility
for functions previously carried out by service
specific bureaus. The local level now has
responsibility for service operation and provid-
ing utilization, cost and productivity informa-
tion. As operators of services and providers
of essential management information com-
munication between field and central levels
has become important in policy decisions.
Districts now have an increased capability
to influence policy in allocating Department
resources in accord with community priorities
although the present fiscal crisis and scarcity
of resources has become a major factor in the
decision-making process.
[Ibid., p. 1153-4]
From the foregoing it appears that the decentralization efforts
were not supported by the type of managerial initiatives (requisites for
success) that are expressed in the principles outlined by Drucker and
Cordiner relative to the experiences of General Motors (GM) and General
Electric (GE) respectively. Both Drucker and Cordiner suggest that for
decentralization to be successful, real authority must be delegated and,
unless top management is deeply and personally dedicated to the effort,
25

actual decentralization will never take place. Notwithstanding the
organizational initiatives (cited by Mustalish) undertaken to strengthen
communications, it appears that such initiatives were designed to sup-
port the status quo, i. e. , to facilitate the flow of information to the
central bureau rather than to enhance the capabilities of regional
managers in the decision-making process.
Cordiner points to the fact that decentralization requires a
clear understanding of the main roles of the principal actors of the
organization. He suggests, in regards to line and staff, that the staff
is to provide ". . . assistance and advice to line operators through a
relatively few experienced people, so that those making decisions can
themselves make them correctly. " As suggested by Mustalish, it
appears that there was not a clear delineation of functional relationships
which resulted in what he referred to as a "logistic nightmare. "
Noticeably absent from the decentralization effort was any
consideration of managerial incentives and performance measures. A
review of the GM/GE principles suggest that decentralization rest on
the need to have personnel policies based on "measured performance,
enforced standards, rewards for good performance, and removal for
incapacity or poor performance. " In addition to the foregoing, it was
suggested that decentralization could be greatly facilitated by a structure
and delegation of responsibility that clearly specified decentralization as
a primary policy. In this regard, it must be concluded that the efforts
26

put forth on behalf of the New York City Department of Health are
inconsistent with the aforementioned recommended behavior.
2. Philadelphia Department of Health
An intensive study of the community health services of the
Philadelphia Department of Public Health was undertaken in 1963 by
Paul W. Purdom. The purpose of his study was to provide further
insight into the operation and function of an organization on a decentral-
ized basis. For the purpose of the analysis decentralization was defined
by Purdom:
.... decentralization will refer to the inten-
tional division of authority to make important
decisions within a unified agency at a single
level of government. In the public health
framework, the term has had application to
efforts to vest such authority in district of-
fices serving a defined geographical area,
but within the political jurisdiction.
[Purdom, p. 509]
Purdom suggested initially that to some extent decentralization
of the administration may have been sought as a goal in itself. Decentral-
ization efforts were in existence as early as 1929. At the time of
Purdom's study the Philadelphia plan was considered to have shown a
greater degree of progress in its decentralization efforts than any large
public health agency.
The aim of the Philadelphia Plan was to delegate primary
responsibility and authority for field operation to the district health
director. The district health director was thus charged with the
27

optimal allocation of health care resources (e. g. , manpower, funds
and facilities including the subfunction associated therewith). [Purdom,
p. 511]
Supporting the district health director in these efforts was a
central Professional Direction Group that was principally charged with
the responsibility for program planning and development, establishment
of technical procedures and program standards, evaluation of program
performance and effectiveness and the establishment of control enforce-
ment activity. [Ibid. ]
As a result of the new decentralization plan (reorganization of
1958) Purdom suggests that there was a greater degree of decentraliza-
tion of administration. Notwithstanding the foregoing, these decentraliza.
tion efforts were not without problems, significant among them were
communications
:
An obvious finding ... is that communications
are, indeed, a vital factor in the administra-
tion of any program and that decentralization
of administration presents special problems in
communications.
.... The preponderance of communication with
the public is through central office personnel.
The bulk of communications between the central
office personnel and those in districts was
directly between the professionals in each
office. The latter might not be viewed so
seriously if other analysis (not shown) had not
revealed that the communications of district
health directors dealt primarily with routine-
type matters, such as leave and travel, and
that communications concerning program con-




.... That the communications patterns revealed
a role for the district health director that was
contrary to the organization plan.
.... The district director was a manager of
sorts for the district, relating more to minor
routine administrative matters than to progress
needs and community relations.
[Ibid.
, p. 512]
In consideration of the foregoing, Purdom suggests alternatives
that might be taken relative to future organizational development to
facilitate decentralization efforts. He outlines three approaches (two
of which are herein considered relevant) dealing with: (1) improved
communications, and (2) strengthening the districts through the estab-
lishment of appropriate support organizations and systems, e.g., the
necessary management information systems. [Purdom, p. 515-17]
What is intended relative to improved communications is the develop-
ment of a system whereby routine communications and minor adminis-
trative matters are prevented from reaching the desk of the district
director, while those communications which are believed to be neces-
sary for him to exercise his assigned responsibility are brought to his
attention. It is suggested that this system might be accomplished by
strengthening the supportive administrative services in the districts,
i. e.
,
by placing a professional administrator in the districts trained
in public health administration. It is anticipated that this action would
allow the district director time to his assigned duties. Purdom further
suggests that the central divisions would have to exercise restraint
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relative to their direct communications with professional counterparts
in the districts regarding matters which fall within the scope of the
district director's responsibilities.
To strengthen the districts through the establishment of appro-
priate support organizations and systems, Purdom suggests that the
districts be staffed with highly trained and competent personnel in
various professional areas. It is further suggested that some of these
personnel be detached from central offices and at the same time strength-
ening districts. Thus ". . . the function of the central office would be
recast to one of research and development, the preparation of long
range plans (i. e.
,
five years or more), consultation and evaluation. "
Purdom speculates that contributing causes of this negative
result may be found in a retrospective analysis of the reorganization
efforts:
In the reorganization of the Community Health
Services it appears that the organizational
method was adopted first, rather than matching
the organizational arrangements to the over-all
objectives. The objectives of this reorganiza-
tion were clearly stated. There was also a
delineation of responsibilities. However, it
appears that preplanning stopped short of
developing a conceptual model of the contem-
plated organization to determine who would per-
form certain functions and where decisions
would be made for very specific actions.
[Ibid.
, p. 514]
Although it may be assumed that based on the foregoing there exist a
greater degree of decentralization in the Philadelphia Department of
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Health than in other health agencies, it appears that the Philadelphia
Plan has not been realized totally. The requisites for success a la the
GM/GE principles were in fact not effectuated to the extent necessary
for that result. Here, as well as the New York City case, real authority-
was not delegated. The role of the staff in rendering assistance and
advice to line managers (district directors) was not clearly defined.
Additionally, top management did not appear to support the decentraliza-
tion efforts enthusiastically with all of the resources at its disposal.
Given that district directors were charged with the optimal
allocation of resources, it appears from the case that district directors
dealt with routine, minor administrative matters while more important
communications, e. g. , budget and program data, by-passed them. In
addition, it was suggested that the role of the district directors developed
contrary to that in the organization plan. At the risk of redundancy,
Drucker and Cordiner pointed to the fact that decentralization rest on
the need to have an appropriate organizational structure, relevant
relationships and specific policies (in support of decentralization) which
are known and thoroughly understood by management personnel. Notice-
ably lacking in this case as well as the previous one was sufficient
consideration given to managerial incentives and performance measures.
Again, the GM/GE principles suggested the fact that decentralization
required personnel policies based on measured performance, enforced
standards and rewards for good performance.
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Thomas, et al suggest that in regards to decentralization
efforts, both the New York City Health Department and the Philadelphia
Health Department, the respective leaders ". . . . do not have clear-cut
principles to guide them and that they are actually confronted with
complex issues, " [Thomas, p. 1621]
It is suggested that the competing roles of generalist and
specialist bring about problems associated with integration and differen-
tiation which then necessitates successful conflict resolution [Lawrence
and Lorsch, op. cit. ] in order to have an effective organization structure,
But there is still another dimension involved -
the competing roles of generalist versus special-
ist. Specialization, the division of labor, is the
hallmark and fundamental element of modern
administration. However, once labor has been
divided, the administrator must: try to assure
coordination to provide an integrated final
product. Historically, the specialist has been
regarded as the embodiment of division of
labor; the generalist, on the other hand, has
been regarded as the coordinator or integrator.
Traditional views consider the generalist as
necessary because coordination is an element
of administration, and presumably he can
coordinate in situations where the specialists
is unable to do so. But increasingly it is
asserted that, even when there is conflict,
specialists can provide what coordination
is needed and that generalists should defer
to the specialists.
[Thomas, p. 1621]
Thomas provides the following suggestions regarding organiz-
ing for decentralization of health departments:
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1. One major challenge in achieving de-
centralization of a large health department
is to provide administrators in charge of
field operations who are competent ....
2. The decentralization of a health depart-
ment could be greatly facilitated by an
organizational structure and allocation of
responsibilities that clearly specify de-
centralization as a primary policy.
3. As an ideal model, structure should
clearly designate a generalist for each
geographic field district as the official to
whom all other personnel in the local office
are responsible, and from whom they receive
their assignments and instructions.
4. General policy statements should
emphasize the desirability of decentralizing
decision-making from the generalist in the




In the preceding discussion, the concept of decentralized
management dealt with both the private as well as the public sectors,
albeit in the case of the former the discussion appeared to be more
substantial. Yet, it is anticipated that the argument relative to de-
centralization was clearly set forth in the literature regarding its theory
and application. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the question can be asked
whether the concept (decentralized management) has the potential for
successful application in the MHSS and more specifically in a regional-
ized health care system?
David A. Pearson, discussing the concept of regionalized per-




The traditional concept of regionalism combines
notions of geography, culture, and fixed bound-
aries delimiting political units or - especially-
important today - economic market areas.
Another familiar use of the term denotes a
type of organization-decentralization. The
joint application of the concepts of geographic
and organizational regionalism provides a struc-
ture within a given boundary or geographic area
for deployment of various consumer goods and
services, based on the logic of regional loca-




Regionalization, in the delivery of health ser-
vices as in other activities, is brought about
because gaps in the production of goods or
services, economic inefficiencies such as dup-
lication of resources, and increasing costs and
expenditures require it - it is mandated by the
logic or organizational theory. The essential
elements of the resulting structure are an
economically, socially, and spatially defined
region and an organization that combines
centralization and decentralization to permit
a two-way flow of activity and a coordinated
effort.
[Ibid., p. 4]
In today's environment, it is anticipated that the challenge
facing top management (DOD decision-makers) of providing high-quality
medical care delivered in an efficient and cost-effective manner would
seem to dictate that bold initiatives be taken that would result in an ap-
propriate regional management structure.
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III. DECENTRALIZATION IN THE MHSS :
THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
A. THE EXISTING ORGANIZATION
The Military Health Services System (MHSS) is made up essentially
of four major sub-systems, i.e. , the three military medical departments
and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, ASD
(HA). The mission of the MHSS is set forth in the Military Health Care
Study Supplement (MHCS Sup. ) as follows:
The mission of the Military Health Services
System is to provide health services neces-
sary to support and maintain high morale in
the uniform services by providing a compre-
hensive and high quality uniform program of
health services for members and other eligible
beneficiaries, and to be responsive to missions




In consonance with the foregoing, current directives suggest that each
military medical department is charged with the responsibility for main-
taining and operating a health care delivery system in support of service
specific operational requirements as well as the provision of quality
health care to eligible DOD beneficiaries. ASD (HA), in addition to
serving as the principal staff advisor to the Secretary of Defense, serves
as program administrator for CHAMPUS (the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniform Services).
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Notwithstanding the minor differences that exist with the organiza-
tional structure of each military medical department, the Surgeons
General have program development responsibility for the medical
component of each branch of service.
Although the Military Medical Departments are
organized differently, the programming of
resources to support their activities is handled
similarly by each service. In each service the
Surgeon General has major responsibility for
developing and defending within his service
and the Department of Defense, to OMB and




In CONUS, each of the three military medical departments has
developed a regionalized system of health care delivery which focuses
on fixed medical facilities, i. e.
,
primary, secondary and tertiary care
facilities. Primary or outpatient care is provided in strategically
located outpatient clinic, regional branch dispensaries (Navy) and
hospital ambulatory care departments, while secondary or routine
inpatient care is provided in both service hospitals and medical centers.
Additionally, in each service region is a medical center complex which
serves as a referral center for highly specialized, or tertiary care,
the primary facility for graduate medical education and clinical
investigation.
For a detailed description of resources programming in the MHSS
see Appendix A.
2
For a more detailed description of the organization of the military
medical department see Appendices B, C and D.
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Despite efforts of Tri-Service cooperation, (see Appendix E), as
well as the goals and objections of the DOD regionalization efforts begun
in 1973, (see Appendix F), the findings of the MHCS suggest the following:
. . . Planning and programming for the direct
care system independent of CHAMPUS^is
inefficient, resulting in substantial over-
or under- estimates of CHAMPUS requirements.
. . . The Tri-Service regionalization program has
not yet achieved its potential for maximizing the
use of cooperative arrangements and improving
the management of Service resources.
. . . Management of selected highly specialized
(tertiary) care is not well coordinated.
Some military medical facilities providing
highly specialized care may not fully utilize all
capability for certain medical procedures.
Relatively large proportions of patients
requiring the highly specialized care selected
for study are transferred to facilities of their
own Service rather than the closest military
facility capable of providing that care.
DOD utilization standards have not been
developed for most of the high cost, special pur-
pose services and equipment studied. Moreover,
there are few generally accepted standards with-
in the civilian community for these services and
equipment.
. . . The MHSS is handicapped by lack of adequate
population, workload, and cost data and com-
parable information systems for the military
departments.
[MHCS, p. 6-7]
The MHCS further suggest that there exist opportunities for significant
improvements in the system relative to resource planning, management
and evaluation, i. e.
,
"... the studies concluded that a number of
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opportunities exist to improve efficiency and effectiveness while main-
taining the delivery of quality care to entitled beneficiaries. " [ibid.
,
p. 5]
B. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
To bring about the desired improvements in the MHSS, the study
2
concluded with nine recommendations. Recommendation 3 provides
the motivation for anticipated organizational structural changes on a
regional basis. The recommendation provides that:
Oversight of health care delivery operations
should be assigned to regional authorities
responsible for all health care delivery in
their CONUS geographical areas.
[Ibid., p. 9]
A further review of the study suggests that due to a lack of con-
sensus relative to the eventual form of the organization for a "regional
authority, " three options were provided.
(1) Implement regional coordination through
the existing service organization and Tri-
Service regionalization program.
(2) Establish a regional coordinating auth-
ority . . . with responsibility for all health
care functions.
(3) Implement a regional management struc-
ture which allocates resources including
funds, facilities, and personnel.
[Ibid.
, p. 83-84]
For a detailed summary of the major findings of the MHCS see
Appendix G.




Regarding the three options of the recommendation, the comments of
the three Surgeons General (which will be discussed below) suggest
their general opposition to the implications of option 3, hence their
acceptance of the concept of a regional authority without the ability
to "compel agreement. " The discussion that follows generally deals
with recommendation 3 option 3 and for the sake of brevity will simply
be referred to as option 3.
Notwithstanding the motivation underlying options 1 and 2, a
regional management structured resulting from either would seem to
support the status quo, i. e. , no meaningful change in the way things
presently are done. Clearly the findings of the MHCS suggest that the
present system has not resulted in the kinds of benefits hoped for.
Further, there seems to be no rationale for assuming that the same
regional management structure without appropriate incentives will
become more efficient and more cost-effective by proclamation.
It is suggested in the literature that managers be given the authority
along with the responsibility to make the kinds of decisions that will
result in efficient management and cost-savings. Thus, the implications
of option 3 seem to be in consonance with the philosophy of decentralized
management espoused by Cordiner and documented by Drucker.
Under options 1 and 2, it is not intended
that regional coordinators should exercise
command or operational control over funds,
facilities or personnel in their region in
carrying out this authority. However, option
3 would allow some level of operational or





Whipple referring to recommendation 5, i.e., to the possible use
of Capitation Budgeting (CB) in the MHSS, further suggests that to attain
the benefits in the MHSS that have resulted in the private sector, man-
agers must be given the decision-making and planning authority com-
mensurate with responsibility in order to achieve cost reductions.
It is impossible for CB to yield any sufficient
benefits in terms of cost containment if those
who are receiving the now capitated budget are
constrained from making cost-saving decision
(and taking the responsibility for them) which
may yield the cost-saving hoped for.
[Whipple, WP2 p. 3]
Referring to the implications of option 3, the Assistant Secretary
for Health (HEW) suggests that the resultant structure seems to provide
for a dual reporting authority as it is defined, and would seem to be in
conflict with recognized management principles (Scalar). He further
suggests, however, that such an organizational structure would provide
significant management control of resources on a regional basis.
. . . The third option, "Implement a regional
management structure which allocates
resources, including funds facilities, and
personnel is not favored because it appears
to establish two lines of authority. That is,
individual units potentially will be responsible
to both a Tri-Service regional management
structure and an individual national military
service management structure. It would
appear that the implementation of a regional
management structure which allocates
resources including funds, facilities, and
personnel does establish significant opera-





Notwithstanding the concern expressed by the Assistant Secretary,
a review of DOD policy and current military directives and regulations
suggests the existence of ample precedence within the current military
establishment to support the provisions and implications of option 3.
The latter portion of the Assistant Secretary's comments relative to
significant management control of resources (an implicit assumption of
option 3), seems to provide the basis for a regional management struc-
ture that at the very least has the potential to affect the desired improve,
ment envisioned in the MHCS relative to a Tri-Service regionalized
system of health care services.
The Surgeon General of the Army (commenting on option 3) raises
questions relative to possible conflicts with the statutory authority and
responsibility of the "Service Secretaries, Chiefs and Surgeons General
with regards to the health of their forces ..." as well as the "service
unique roles and missions ..." It is further suggested that the tighter
management control of resources resulting from option 3 could possibly
lead to a chaotic state of affairs. With regard the former concern,
given that there does in fact exist "conflict, " it is anticipated that the
reorganizational authority of the Executive Branch granted President
Carter by Congress could eliminate the need for this concern. With
regard the latter point, it is further anticipated that there exists within
DOD and the current military establishment sufficient expertise to
design and affect a regional management structure consistent with
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option 3 that would not compromise operational responsiveness to
military contingency requirements, i. e. , that will safeguard "...
effective, timely, military service response to defense contingencies. "
[MHCS, p. 84]
The comments of the Surgeon General of the Navy (cited in the
MHCS) do not appear to address option 3 directly, but seem to imply
that recommendation 3 excludes any consideration of operation control
of resources by a regional coordinating authority. The comments of
the Navy Surgeon General (at the time of the study) are especially
pertinent:
. . . We understand that recommendation 3:
(a) Intends that the "regional authorities"
will function as Tri-Service regional coor-
dinators (b) Does not intend that the Tri-
Service regional coordinators should
exercise operational control over facilities
or personnel in their respective region
(c) Intends to insure continued responsive-
ness of regional health care delivery to
all military priorities of the respective
services.
[Ibid.]
In consideration of the foregoing remarks, it seems that the Surgeon
General of the Navy accepted by default the concept of a regional authority
that cannot "compel agreement, " thus his position appeared to agree with
that of both the Assistant Secretary for Health (HEW) and the Surgeon
General of the Army.
The response of the Surgeon General of the Air Force to option 3
appears to highlight the fundamental issue associated with this option
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and the potential for success of any regionalized management structure,
i. e. , "... it would be difficult to conceive an organizational mode of
regional managers with authority to allocate resources without exercising
operational control over funds, facilities, and personnel ..." [ibid. ] It
is suggested by the writer that the lack of such authority (which is not
expressed in option 1 or 2) may be a contributing cause to the findings
of the MHC, e. g. , that Tri-Service regionalization, the coordination of
highly specialized care . . . etc. , have not resulted in a full realization of
potential reward and benefits. Thus, the establishment of a regional
management structure responsible for all health care delivery defined
within the parameters of option 3 appears to be consistent with the find-
ings in the literature, specifically the works of Purdom and Mustalish as
well as the research conducted by Whipple in the area of capitation budget-
ing and the associated incentive structure found in the private sector.
C. THE FUNCTION OF A REGIONAL AUTHORITY
Recommendation 2 of the MHCS proposed that a "central entity" be
established within DOD to serve as a coordinating mechanism for plan-
ning and allocating resources as well as exercise oversight of health
care delivery in CONUS. To facilitate the discussion that follows, it is
assumed that some form of a central entity will exist and that it will be
the reporting authority for the posited regional authority. Subject
The DOD Health Council (DHC) was established in 1976 to meet the
objectives of recommendation 2 and to advise the Secretary of Defense
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to the mandate imposed by higher authority, it is further assumed that
the focus of the central entity's attention will be strategic in nature
emphasizing the development of broad policies and guidelines (designed
to ensure the existence of an effective and efficient health care delivery
system). As an alternative view, it is conjectured that the central
entity may be concerned with goal maximization subject to constraints
imposed by contingency requirements, Congressional legislation affect-
ing the MHSS, as well as the availability of resources. Figure 1 provides
an illustrative over -simplification of what is considered to be the goal
optimization interface between the proposed management subsystems
(in the MHSS).
The discussion which follows focuses on the regional management
level with some consideration given to the regional medical center/
facility level (which subsequently will be considered in more detail).
Suffice it to say at the regional management level, it is posited that
management will be concerned with minimizing the deviation by the
regions as a whole and by facility-managers in particular from estab-
lished goals and objectives in support of mission requirements. It is
further anticipated that given appropriate incentives, regional facility-
concerning overall health matters. For the capitation budgeting
demonstration project (scheduled for FY 78, contract awarded to
McKinzie and Co. ) the DHC will serve as the regional coordinating





















managers will act to minimize cost in carrying out regional programs
that will result in efficiencies as well as quality care. Whipple suggests
that the desired behavior on the part of management could be motivated
by an appropriate incentive mechanism that would allow the cost-savings
thus accrued to be shared by those contributing to such savings; i. e.
,
a mechanism whereby regional managers as well as facility-managers
would benefit from cost savings that result from managerial innovation
and system efficiency. Whipple further suggests that the greatest
savings would accrue at the facility-manager level rather than the
regional level; i. e.
,
it is suggested that facility-managers are involved
with and have the potential to exercise control over the day-to-day
decision-making process that could in fact result in either cost savings
or cost increases. [Whipple Fr p. 8] It is therefore conjectured that a
necessary condition for managerial innovation with the potential for cost-
reductions is the ability of facility-managers to be in a position to
exercise the kinds of prerogatives relative to decision- making and plan-
ning that could result in cost savings and increased system efficiency.
To further facilitate the discussion regarding the function of the
posited regional authority, additional assumptions relative to the
remaining recommendation of the MHCS must be made. These include
the assumptions that population demographics and size will form the
basis for CONUS health care planning, that resource programming and
budgeting will be on a capitation basis, that both the direct care system
and CHAMPUS resources will be integrated in some fashion, that
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performance factors probably based on cost per beneficiary be developed
to assess efficiency, that inpatient utilization control incentives be estab-
lished, and that dual choice for non-active duty beneficiaries will even-
tually be established in the MHSS.
Given the foregoing it is anticipated that regarding regional health
care programs, the regional authority will be concerned with the follow-
ing:
1. Planning, programming, and evaluation
of health care delivery operations, including
CHAMPUS.
2. Planning, programming, and evaluation
of investment equipment procurement and
health facility construction.
3. Professional technical education programs.
4. Professional and technical personnel
policies.
5. Planning, Programming and Budgeting
actions.
Implicit in the assumptions of the MHCS recommendations is the
fact that on a regional level for a specified catchment population (eligible
DOD beneficiaries) whose members would be constrained from seeking
care outside the MHSS, the posited regional authority would be respon-
sible for providing a specified level and range of health care services.
If, in fact, the foregoing assumptions do reflect the true state of affairs,
it is conjectured that such assumptions will tend to provide the necessary
incentive for the regional authority to take such actions that will result
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in the optimal allocation of resources relative to the health care
services provided. It is anticipated that the scope of services should
include interrelated health care programs from within the MHSS as
well as CHAMPUS. The conjecture here is that in some areas (Tri-
service regions) CHAMPUS cost may well vary with the direct care
cost of the MHSS. As Terasawa points out:
If in every region the marginal cost of one
particular delivery system is lower than
the other, then the knowledge of aggregate
marginal cost is both necessary and suf-
ficient in arriving at a cost minimizing
alternative. In this . . . the aggregation
procedure tends to underestimate the cost
savings which may result from an increased
use of the direct care system facilities and
corresponding decrease in the use of
CHAMPUS . . . The mere knowledge of the
relative size of "aggregate marginal cost"
is neither necessary nor sufficient in
determining a truly cost minimizing
alternative . . .
[Terasawa, p. 6-7]
It is therefore further anticipated that a trade-off between CHAMPUS
and the direct care system relative to some specific health program or
program element may result (given that CHAMPUS costs are lower).
To the extent that the marginal cost of delivering care for various
regional programs can be identified and where such costs are less than
the marginal cost of CHAMPUS, the incentive to maximize the use of
MHSS regional facility is clearly stated. [Terasawa and Whipple, p. 3]
"When considering the scope of regional health care program, the
conjecture here is that regional managers will be concerned with the
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total utilization of regional facilities in support of such programs, i. e. ,
ensuring the most cost-effective utilization of available resources and
planning adjustment to the level of available resources. Of additional
concern is the avoidance of overcapitalization and duplication of services
Both of the latter considerations are directly related to the question of
facility- specific total cost. Terasawa and Whipple suggest that there
are two components that contribute to the total cost of an operation at a
military health care facility: the "periodic fixed cost" and the variable
cost of operations:
. . . We posit that the total "periodic fixed
costs" of operating the facility are depend-
ent on the physical size, the number of
staffed beds, and the expected case-mix
of the facility. Next the variable cost of
operating the facility will depend on both
the level of operation for which it is staffed
and the utilization of the facility ....
[Ibid., p. 2]
The foregoing suggests that only those capital improvement and
service programs would be established at facilities that could best
provide the service efficiently and economically for the projected
demands for the eligible population. It is further anticipated that such
decisions would necessarily take into account the non-dollar cost to the
beneficiary population as well, i. e.
,
location and accessibility. The
concern here is to minimize the total cost of delivered care to all
eligible beneficiaries without sacrificing necessary quality or reducing
the requisite scope of regional health programs.
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Once consideration has been given to regional health care programs
and facility requirements in support of such programs, it is anticipated
the regional managers will be concerned with ". . . skills, and number
of people per skill, necessary to staff health care facility. " [Adzies
and Zukin, p. 25] A necessary consideration here would be an approp-
riate mix of providers, i. e. , the ratio of physicians to new health
professionals (NHPs) with the potential for greater productivity. Given
the assumption that regional managers will now absorb total personnel
costs, it is anticipated that these managers will be motivated to seek
increases in provider productivity by augmenting providers groups with
NHPs, e.g., NAMICS, nurse practitioners as well as physician assist-
ants where feasible. It is suggested that the experiences of the three
military medical departments with NHPs supported by similar experiences
in the private sector should provide sufficient justification for optimism
12
relative to such productivity innovations. '
See for example the research report prepared under the continuing
contract between OASD (M&RA) and the Naval Postgraduate School, en-
titled "Studies of the Effectiveness of Paramedical Personnel Usage in
Medical Care Delivery. "
2
See the Final Report of the HMEIA Research Project Contract
NOl-MB-44173 (P) on the Cost Effectiveness of Physician Assistants
prepared by the Bureau of Health Resources Development, Health
Resources Administration, Department of Health, Education and
Welfare and the Kaiser Foundation Health Services Research Center,





Once regional health programs have been developed and facility and
personnel requirements to support such programs determined and quanti-
fied, it is suggested that regional managers will be concerned with fund
allocations and managerial control of resources. Regarding regional
capitation budget allocations, Whipple suggests that the total system's
cost including CHAMPUS costs for the catchment area population be
included in the capitation budget and "funneled through a regional authority. "
[Whipple, Fr p. 2] Recognition of facility- specific costs associated with
regional medical center/facilities as well as the characteristics of the
beneficiary population "assigned" to such facilities suggests that sub-
allocation methodologies will be required relative to intra- regional
resource allocations.
Considering the foregoing, it is conjectured that budgeting and finan-
cial control systems will become critical factors relative to the eventual
accomplishment of region goals and objectives. It is further conjectured
that such management information necessarily be regionally based in
order to provide, for example, regional utilization and beneficiary cost
data; i. e. , an adequate base of information for the regional manager
(decision-maker). It is therefore intended that management capture in
the planning process the total range of relevant costs in order that such
costs be reflected in the capitation rate setting process.
Managerial control of resources in the MHSS historically has pro-
vided a formidable challenge to top management. Notwithstanding the
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concerned with what activities the organization should undertake, (i. e.
,
its planned output) and, what resources it should use, (i.e., its planned
inputs)? "After the fact, " management looks at how effectively the
organization did its job (i. e. , its actual output relative to the organiza-
tion objective) and how efficiently the organization used the resources
thus employed, (i.e. , its actual cost to expected cost). Hence, manage-
ment control of resources in the Military Health Services System can be
defined as that process by which military health care administrators
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently.
It is suggested in the literature and recognized by the writer that
it rarely is possible to find a single overall measure of performance
for non-profit organizations that will approximate the profit measure
found in profit oriented organizations. In this regard the MHSS is cer-
tainly no exception. Rather we seek performance indicators that are of
use to top management, (central entity and regional authority), as well
as operational managers, (local commands), relative to the management
control function. It is anticipated that the referenced research efforts in
this area will soon produce reliable performance indicators for use by
the regional authority.
Recommendation 1 of the MHCS provides that "National Security
Mobilization, contingency and other essential force requirements should
be the primary determinant of the size and composition of the peace time
military medical force ..." [MHCS, p. 8] It is beyond the scope and
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intent of the current effort to attempt to prescribe the exact form of
the operational relationship that should exist between the MHSS and the
three service components. In accordance with the implications of the
recommendation, it is anticipated that the regional health program
developed in accordance with policy and priority guidance provided by
higher authority (central entity) will provide the necessary mission
support. It is conjectured that such program development might take
the form of a five year regional plan (defense) with a chapter for each
regional medical center/facility. Further, it is anticipated that the
regional authority will ensure that the requirements for mobilization
contingencies be met by timely, systematic review and evaluation
routines, as well as the establishment and dissimination of regional
planning guidance. It is recognized that there probably exist differing
requirements associated with a purely peace-time CONUS based health
care delivery system contrasted with that for mobilization contingencies
It is therefore suggested that effective integration and coordination of
both requirements become prime requisites for eventual success with-
out degrading the regional health program.
D. REGIONAL HEALTH PLANNING AGENCY (RHPA)
The preceding discussion focused on the functions of a regional
authority with some consideration given to the potential interface
between the regional authority and the regional medical center/facility
level. Given the possible range and scope of regional health care
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program, it is conjectured that a significant amount of planning and
coordination will be further requisite conditions for successful mission
accomplishment. In the MHSS (already a highly complex system), it is
anticipated that there will exist a high level of differentiation within and
among the restructured system's components. Consider for example,
the fact that within each service department there exist graduate medical
education, clinical investigation, as well as continuing medical education,
programs, not to mention the traditional care delivery sub-systems (e.g.
,
clinics, dispensaries, etc. ) with associated administrative support mech-
anisms which are believed to be peculiar to each military medical depart-
ment. Additionally, with command and control of health care services
particular to each service department (under the current organizational
structure) it is conjectured that there may exist service-specific prior-
ities and perceptions as well as differing methodologies within each
department that would require the integration of specialized components
in order to achieve the desired level of cooperation and coordination in
the MHSS in general and within Tri- Service regions in particular. It is
further conjectured that the achievement of the requisite level of coopera-
tion and coordination will be predicated in part on the degree in which a
regional entity identification can be established with the potential for
commanding the loyalties (esprit de corps) believed to be traditionally
associated with the separate service systems.
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It is suggested that situational developments as a result of the
previously described differences could be exacerbated by the fact that
strong advocates of the current system may not come to the conclusion
(along with DOD decision-makers) that benefits associated with the new
system (the posited Tri-Service regional management structure) suf-
ficiently exceed those of the current structure and hence will tend to
withhold their enthusiastic support of any organizational initiatives
relative to significant system changes. A few examples have been
presented here in an effort to set forth some of the general issues that
would have to be dealt with if reorganization efforts are to result in an
effective organizational structure.
The contingency theory of Lawrence and Lorsch suggests that as an
organization such as the MHSS takes on more complex tasks, it will tend
to become more complicated structurally by differentiating new organiza-
tional components (in this instance the posited regional management
structure). Further, it is suggested that these highly differentiated
units must be brought together in an integrated whole in order for the
resultant organization to be effective. The relevant question here is
whether or not the degree of integration required because of the proposed
changes in the MHSS will result in a manageable structure. The conjec-
ture here is that it is in fact manageable and that an additional regional
entity is required which will augment the recommended regional authority
and the already existing regional medical center/facilities. This entity

must provide further coordination and integration, as well as provide
the regional decision-maker with an adequate basis of information to
support the resource optimizing behavior previously described.
Pearson, in discussing the historical development of regionalized
health services in the U.S., indicates:
It was recognized that this overall scheme
would be ineffective without proper planning
and coordination. - In each local community,
a planning agency would be created to develop
the program. A local body would be neces-
sary to coordinate the services and programs
of community medical centers and their affil-
iated institutions with other health activities
in the area. Local coordinating agencies
would also evaluate the study needs for their
particular areas. The ultimate control mech-
anism was vested in a state coordinating agency
or board, which would supervise the develop-
ment of community medical centers and evaluate
branches and stations to prevent unnecessary
duplication and uncoordinated construction of
facilities. In addition, this coordinating body
would study problems of organization and
financing and would initiate necessary
legislation.
[Pearson, p. 13]
James Zimmer and Robert Berg, discussing the problems asso-
ciated with providing an adequate base of information for decision-
making in a regionalized system, suggest that regional planning and
coordination will depend on having an adequate data base, and that for
such an effort, data are required essentially for two purposes, ". . .





Motivated in part by what Zimmer and Berg call unmet needs and
cost containment, Congress passed the National Health Planning
Resources and Development Act (P.L. 92-641) in January 1975.
Martin S. Perlin summarizes the relationship of the public law to plan-
ning and coordination and points to the role of the health system
agencies (HSAs):
There is no longer an alternative to formal
long range planning by health institutions.
The National Health Planning Resources and
Development Act (P.L. 93-641), following
on the heels of an increasing number of state
laws on certificate of need, has set in place
a new era in health facility planning. In ad-
dition to outside regulations and controls over
the operation of health facilities, the top
management of today's hospitals must demon-
strate that plans for new facilities and major
programs are based on sound and defensible
planning processes . Those agencies respon-
sible for implementing these regulations will
have the necessary clout to make them
stick.
[ Perlin, p. 19]
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, it is suggested that
within the MHSS and specifically at the regional management level a
military regional health planning agency (RHPA) be established to thus
provide an "adequate base of information" for the regional decision-
maker and to function as a regional planning and coordinating staff.
For a detailed analysis of P. L. 92-641 see Truesdell, W.C., Jr.
and Duny, M. S.
,
An Analysis of National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act of 1974 and Its Impact On Health Care
,
Masters Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1976.
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Recognizing that there is probably no universal "best" arrangement for
organizing to do the work of planning and coordination. Figure 2 pro-
vides an illustration of a regional management structure depicting the
posited RHPA. It is posited here that for each MHSS region, the regional
authority should be supported by a RHPA.
E. THE FUNCTION OF A RHPA
To facilitate the following discussion, it will be assumed (in accord-
ance with the findings and recommendations of the MHCS) that the req-
uisite management information system (MIS) will exist. The MIS
envisioned here falls within the definition provided by Davis and Freeman
in their discussion of the hospital manager's need for a management in-
formation system --a system that will provide not just information but
one that will directly support and assist decision making:
The term information system refers to the pro-
cedure, or mechanism, whereby numeric,
alphabetic, graphic, photographic or other in-
formation is gathered, stored, perhaps re-
arranged, and retrieved. A management
information system makes this information
avilable to managers who are responsible
for planning, operations, and control, in
a form directly applicable to their manage-
ment tasks. Not every information system
qualifies as a management information system.
[Davis and Freeman, p. 67]
To further emphasize the distinction and potential utility of the



















EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
Type of System





Example of Personnel Functions
Positing time and attendance;
producing paychecks; reporting
labor districution.
Simultaneous updating of payroll
and personnel files after across-
the-board wage increase.
Provides individual salary histories
or absenteeism records.
Productivity reporting based on
performance standards, exception
reports for turnover and absentee-
ism, workload forecasts, work
schedules
.
Source: Health Care Management Review, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 6, Fall 1977,
With the previous distinctions as benchmarks, it is further assumed
that among the characteristics of the MIS, it will be regionally based (in
regional medical center/facilities) and that it will facilitate the develop-
ment of budgeting and financial control data (e. g. , uniform chart of
accounts for regional medical center/facilities).
At this juncture a brief discussion of planning that endeavors to link
the traditional organizational components, e. g. , the marketing, produc-
tion, human resources and financial components in commercial organiza-
tions (such as General Motors and General Electric) to planning in the
health care sector appears useful. Adzes and Zukin, discussing
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management's approach to health planning suggest that there exists a
relationship between planning for organizational subsystems and health
system planning. They further suggest that the marketing function
includes:
o Assessing health status and health care
needs and demands.
o Deciding on the type of services, facilities
and programs that will meet these needs
and demands in a practical, affordable,
and cost-effective manner.
o Designing the programs to promote the
use of services, and health itself.
o Considering the effect of price (charges
for services) or inconvenience (distance
traveled or waiting time) on the use of
services.
[Adizes and Zukin, p. 20]
The marketing subsystem is thus designated by the acronym "NSC"
which stands for "needs assessment/scope of service/client interface. "
Regarding the production subsystem, it is suggested that produc-
tion encompasses all of the activity that results in a desired output, i. e.
,
the process of rendering care.
... In commercial organizations, produc-
tion includes the manufacturing and engineer-
ing systems. For a health organization of
national scope, production includes the design,
location, and operation of facilities; main-
tenance programs for equipment; transporta-
tion, communication and other infrastructure;
stores and supplies --in short, all that needs
to be done in order to provide for health. In





structural changes as well as the managerial innovations currently
recommended, it is anticipated that the challenge will continue to exist.
Accepted criteria for the assessment of management control, (i. e.
,
measures of managerial performance), is the evaluation of efficiency
and effectiveness. It is considered necessary and desirable to have
efficiency measures that could compare in some form inputs to outputs
relative to a process of production; and to have effectiveness measures
that could take into account the relationship of outputs to the goals and
objectives of an organization.
Health care facilities in the MHSS may be thought of as "respon-
sibility centers " in which inputs (wages, personnel, supplies, etc.)
converted to cost elements, are thus compared to output, e. g. , services
rendered.
Inputs "> Responsibility Centers j Output
Cost J Processor J Services
Of special concern to management are performance indicators that will
assess the expected cost of various factors of production (inputs) with
the actual cost of producing a certain product mix. In this regard, it has
been suggested in the literature that "before the fact" management is
Research is currently being conducted in this area under the continu-
ing contract between BUMED/Code 02 and the Naval Postgraduate School,
entitled "Investigation of the Possible Uses of Performance Indicators to
Foster Efficiency in the MHSS. " See also "Controlling Hospital Cost: An




The human resources subsystem emphasizes personnel require-
ment, including employee development, incentive/ reward mechanisms,
and performance evaluation. Referring to the financial subsystem, it
is suggested that the concern here is for both capital as well as quanti-
fying the cost of facilities and services. "In this subsystem we are
concerned with the source, use, allocation and control of money in
relation to the programs and activities of the organization, [ibid. ] It
is further suggested that the four subsystems provide the basis of a
"planning tent" in the health care sector:
In sum, what we have is one subsystem (NSC)
that determines the needs of the client or the
environment and how to satisfy these needs,
and three subsystems that actually fulfill these
needs. Planning then becomes the process of
integrating these four subsystems so that they
come together into a common focus or mission.
[Ibid. ]
The foregoing discussion regarding health planning has a direct ap-
plication in the MHSS. The planning considerations discussed will form
the basis for delineating the functions of the posited RHPA relative to
regional military health care programs. In this regard Davis and
Freeman indicate that "the availability and use of information in the
decision-making process is not just one prerequisite for efficient and
effective management ... it is the prerequisite. " [Davis and Freeman,
p. 68] Thus, in a very broad sense, it is suggested that the RHPA in
its planning and programming function, delineated by higher authority
will be concerned with the following decision process:
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1. Defining and assessing the level of health care need for the
regional catchment area population.
2. Analyzing the area of need with regards to the potential demand
for care and facility utilization.
3. Defining and developing general goals relative to health care
needs of the regional catchment area population.
4. Developing specific program objectives relative to the pre-
viously established goals.
5. Identifying alternative courses of action.
6. Selecting desired alternative courses of action for further
consideration.
7. Developing and recommending specific courses of action to the
regional decision-maker.
8. After implementation, evaluating performance with respect to
effectiveness and efficiency.
Support of the specific functional concerns of the regional authority
(see page 47 ), it is anticipated that the RHPA (in consonance with the
foregoing decision process) will endeavor to accomplish the following:
1. Regarding planning, programming and evaluation of regional
health care delivery operations, it is anticipated that the RHPA will;
a. Delineate specific regional health programs
;
b. Clarify options relative to such programs, taking into
account possible champus tradeoffs;
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c. Recommend procedures to improve efficiency;
d. Detail financial implications of recommended actions;
e. Monitor system performance relative to the quality of
care rendered and program effectiveness. Regarding quality
of care and program effectiveness, it is suggested that "unmet
needs" [Zimmer and Berg op-cit.
, ] will be identified through
patient dissatisfaction (the perceived quality of care) and thus
provide an indicator of consumers perception of, for example,
the degree to which "providers" measure up to certain standards.
2. Regarding planning, programming and evaluation of investment
equipment procurement and health facility construction, it is anticipated
that the RHPA will develop procedures and methodologies to prevent
over-capitalization and duplication of service in regional medical center/
facilities. For example, all investment equipment requests would be
funneled through the RHPA for review and recommendation for approval/
disapproval before such requests would be considered by the regional
authority. It is further anticipated that the RHPA will develop a regional
capital expenditure program designed to ensure the timely replacement
of existing investment equipment. Regarding facility construction, it is
Research is currently being conducted in this area under the
continuing contract between BUMED/Code 02 and the Naval Postgraduate




anticipated that the RHPA will monitor maintenance and repair pro-
grams within the region through, for example, a system of periodic
inspection routines that would ensure timely recommendations for the
replacement of existing facilities as well as the construction of new
facilities to meet expanding requirements.
3. Regarding professional and technical education programs, it
is conjectured that the RHPA will: (a), serve as the focal point for
coordinating graduate medical education programs and continuing
medical educating programs; and (b), provide the mechanism for coor-
dinating employee development programs for both civilians and military
personnel.
4. Regarding professional and technical personnel policies, it is
anticipated that the RHPA will be concerned with the development of:
(a), regional standards relative to hiring, training and disciplinary
policies; and (b), incentive reward systems. Such reward systems
might take the form suggested by Whipple in which facility-managers
as well as the regional authority benefit from accrued cost-saving.
[Whipple op. cit. ] It is conjectured here that there probably exists
within each military medical department different policies and local
procedures that relate to personnel practices; and that such policies,
procedures and practices will have an ultimate impact on the kind of
incentive reward system eventually established.
5. Regarding planning, programming and budgeting actions, it
is anticipated that the RHPA will provide the necessary support to the
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regional authority for both budget formulation and budget execution
on a regional basis. In this regard it is further anticipated that the
agency will render technical guidance and assistance (related to the
planning guidance set forth by the regional authority in accordance
with policies and priorities, planning data and per-capita resource
ceilings established by the central entity) to regional medical center/
facilities relative to their operating budget formulation and subsequent
submission. Given the foregoing it is suggested that the RHPA then
provide the necessary support to the regional authority for the develop-
ment of the regional operating budget based on these component budget
inputs and on projected changes in the size, characteristics and deploy-
ment of the beneficiary catchment area population. In addition, it is
anticipated that the agency will develop sub-capitation methodologies
for intra regional resource allocations taking into account the facility-
specific total cost of regional medical center/facilities and the charac-
teristics of the beneficiary population assigned to such facilities.
An implicit assumption relative to the foregoing discussion is that
the planning forecasts (both short and long range) will be predicated on
environmental analysis (both external and internal). It is suggested
that the relevant characteristic of both have been taken into considera-
tion in the foregoing discussions although not explicitly cited under the
headings of internal and external environmental analysis. Suffice it

















a. Crude death rate
b. Age specific death rate
2. Morbidity
a. Incidence of disease
b. Prevalence of disease
c. Disability data








I. Facilities for care of ambulatory patients




B. Hospital clinics -- general or special





H. Neighborhood service centers
I. Community mental health centers
H. Facilities for emergency services
A. First aid stations
B. Emergency service units
1. Community-based
2. Hospital-based
III. Facilities for patients requiring residential care (in-patient)
A. Short term general hospitals





C. Chronic disease and long term hospitals
D. Acute psychiatric hospitals
E. General hospital sections of psychiatric communities
F. Rehabilitation hospitals





1. Schools and colleges
2. Sections of homes for the aged and homes for children






B. Visiting nurse agencies










F. Prosthesis and appliance fitters and makers
G. Opticians
VI. Supply services
A. Manufacturers and distributors of drugs
B. Manufacturers and distributors of medical and dental
supplies and equipment
C. Publishers of health services literature





formats for consideration by the RHPA relative to the external environ-
ment, while an assessment of the internal organization is believed to be
an ongoing process in the aforementioned planning and programming
considerations.
F. THE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER /FACILITY
In the following discussion emphasis will be placed on (1), the
general role of the regional medical center/facility-manager in provid-
ing support for as well as the execution of regional health programs;
(2), the potential interaction of the facility-manager (CO.) with the
organization's staff (administrators and providers); and (3), the poten-
tial interface between the facility-management and the regional manage-
ment levels. It is not the intent here to prescribe the exact form,
course of action, or direction that the facility-manager should take
relative to the eventual accomplishment of the organization's mission.
Rather, what is intended is an exploration of those principles and con-
siderations which are believed to be logically derived from the fore-
going literature review and subsequent discussions. The conjecture
here is that there exists within the current structure sufficient expert-
ise (in and among the various levels of facility-managers and specialists
groups) to adequately chart the necessary courses of action that would
be required to achieve (within the parameters set forth by a central
entity) the specified goals and objectives of the MHSS.
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The following assumptions will then serve as a basis for the dis-
cussion: (1) A greater degree of dec is ion-making and planning will be
delegated to lower levels of management (the regional authority and
facility-managers) in order that those managers who are actually in
positions to make the kinds of management decisions that might result
in cost-saving (or increases) can in fact do so; (2) Appropriate incentive/
reward systems will be developed and subsequently implemented in order
to enhance the likelihood of achieving the desired goal maximizing/cost
minimizing behavior by both providers and administrators -- thus creat-
ing the type of competitive climate that could possibly result in a greater
degree of satisfaction by those involved in the decision process; (3) Per-
formance indicators of some fashion will be developed and available
which will measure the system's efficiency and effectiveness thereby
providing a means to compare regional medical center/facilities (intra,
as well as extra, regionally); (4) True enrollment of the beneficiary
population will be affected from which some measure of the reasonable
cost of providing care per beneficiary could be ascertained; (5) Regional
medical center /facilities will in fact be assigned responsibility for
providing the total health care "needs" of designated beneficiaries
within a specific regional location; (6) Budgeting for the projected
"demands" of the eligible beneficiary population will be on a capitation
basis; (7) Material requirements in support of military contingencies
as well as certain categories of medical equipment (e. g. , in the former
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case, a "surgical team block, " and in the latter case, Computer
Assisted Tomography Scanner or "Cat Scanner") will be budgeted for
on a line-item basis and therefore not be included in the capitated
budget; (8) Sub -capitation methodologies for the intra-regional
resource allocations will be developed that would be sensitive to
facility-specific costs; (9) Methodologies for monitoring the quality
of care rendered as well as patient satisfaction will be available.
Based on the foregoing assumptions it is conjectured that the
facility-manager will be concerned with achieving a high level of coor-
dination and cooperation within and among various highly specialized
units of the organization in order to ensure the attainment of mission
requirements in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Literature
findings suggest that the degree in which organizational effectiveness
is achieved is predicated in part upon the level and degree of involve-
ment in the decision process by those who are responsible for ensuring
specific task accomplishment (e.g., service chiefs and department
chairmen). The point to be emphasized here is the fact that managers
are more apt to support and pursue those programs and objectives
when they have had an active part in establishing them.
It would seem then that the facility-manager should endeavor to
develop (in the organization) the kind of environment that would be
conducive to an interchange of ideas and recommendations with and
among the organization's staff (both administrators and providers).

It is suggested that examples of the kinds of initiatives that might be
taken by the facility-manager could take the form of regularly scheduled
conferences with key staff members for the purposes of exploring the
consequences of, and seeking timely recommendations regarding changes
in, the external environment that have potential impact on the organiza-
tion. Such changes might be brought about by demographic shifts result-
ing from, for example, a squadron transfer or the permanent change in
home port of a carrier (from San Diego to Norfolk). Relevant con-
siderations relative to the foregoing might involve assessing the poten-
tial impact of such changes on clinic operations, i. e. , which clinics
would be affected and to what degree.
Additional considerations (by the facility-manager) might result in
the formation of task oriented staff groups for the purpose of determining
(for example) the appropriate panel size (number of families /enrollees
per physician) to be included in a newly proposed family practice pro-
gram or, exploring and making recommendations relative to appropriate
provider/physician extender ratios for given levels of health services,
specific health programs, clinics or branch facilities. It is conjectured
that although some of the previously noted examples may be visible
within the current structure, they nevertheless could serve to reinforce
the efforts on the part of the facility-manager in attempting to promote
greater degrees of participation by the organization's staff.
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At this juncture, it is anticipated that the discussion will be en-
hanced by considering the potential interface between the facility-manager
and that of the regional authority levels. It is posited that the regional
medical center/facility represents that part of the proposed regional
management structure where basic health care programs are carried
out and as a result will be the focal point for any cost- savings which may
be realized. It then seems reasonable to conjecture that both the re-
gional authority and the facility-manager will be concerned with the pro-
cess in which health care is rendered. As was previously stated,
management will be concerned with the actual resources utilized in
producing a particular output. Alternatively, management will be con-
cerned with how efficiently the organization employed the resources
available to it in achieving its objectives.
It is anticipated that there are a number of considerations as well as
a combination of activities that will require integration in some fashion
in order to affect the desired level of manager control. Figure 3 pro-
vides an illustrative simplification of the kinds of data considerations/
activities that might result at both levels. It is posited that the RHPA,
acting within the parameters set by the regional authority will provide
the necessary support function in facilitating the interaction between
both management levels. Such activities on the part of the RHPA could
take the form of systematic assessments of utilization impact (provided
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and effectiveness through the use of developed methodologies. In addi-
tion, the RHPA could monitor the degree of goal deviation and assess
the potential impact on regional health programs by those programs
proposed as alternatives by the facility- manager.
More specifically, consider the following examples of the potential
interface between the principal actors of the posited regional manage-
ment structure. First, suppose that two regional medical facilities
located within 30 miles of each other (belonging to different service
components) have submitted requests for a "Cat Scanner, " (this would
remain a "line item budget" element under the proposed system). It is
conjectured that within the current system each facility could conceiv-
ably be funded for this item since the approval and funding process by
the cognizant authorities may not take into account the fact that a similar
request is being evaluated simultaneously for an adjacent regional
medical facility or the fact that such an item may indeed exist in an
adjacent facility. Thus the potential exists for overcapitalization and
duplication of services.
It is suggested, however, that under the proposed system the poten-
tial for such overcapitalization and duplication of services tends to be
reduced significantly (and at a substantial cost-savings). The process
would involve an evaluation of the facility-managers' requests for the
item by the RHPA. The need for the item in the region would first be
determined. That is, the probable total demand for Scans to be generated

by the overall catchment population would be estimated. If it is con-
firmed that there exists a "need, " each facility would then be evaluated
with respect to its capacity to provide the service in a more efficient
and cost-effective manner. Based on the results of the foregoing analysis,
the RHPA would then make appropriate recommendations to the regional
authority relative to the requested item.
The facility-manager (under the proposed system) would be motivated
by at least two considerations. First, his facility would be competing
with other regional medical center/facilities for particular items of
investment equipment (items costing $1, 000. 00 or more, eg. , a "Cat
Scanner"). Given the existence of such a competitive environment, it is
suggested that the incentive exists for that manager to operate his facility
in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Second, unlike the current
system in which methods of prioritizing items of investment equipment
may be found (at the facility- manager level) that may be based largely
on political considerations which may in fact outweigh other merits and
hence determine the level of priority eventually assigned the requested
item, the facility-manager now can seize the opportunity to reward a
service chief or department chairman for efficient management by for-
warding the request directly to the regional authority (with a strong
recommendation for purchase) as one of his facility's high priority items.
Next, consider a permanent change in home port of two navy aircraft
carriers (CVAs) from the west coast to the east coast. As previously
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noted, relevant considerations for both the facility- manager and the
regional authority relative to such a development would involve assessing
the potential impact on regional facility utilization in terms of health care
programs offered and the number and type of providers required to sup-
port such programs. It is posited that the RHPA will provide the demo-
graphic data and subsequent data analysis to both the regional authority
and the facility- manager relative to the potential environmental impact
of this development, and thus on their capitation rates and catchment
population size. It is therefore anticipated that the role played by the
RHPA will facilitate the decision process thus employed by the regional
authority and the facility-manager in making necessary adjustments to
regional health programs and specific components thereof.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although there seems to be no precise definition, the concept of
decentralization as a philosophy of management appears to have a set
of "first principles. " Thus, a case has been made for the concept's
consideration by DOD decision-makers in their efforts to affect the
changes recommended in the MHCS.
The review of the literature suggests that changing from a highly
centralized to a decentralized organization structure (such as the MHSS)
provides a formidable challenge to the executive group. In this regard
it is pointed out that there exists certain environmental considerations
that must be dealt with if an effective organizational structure is to
result. These considerations involve issues of organizational design
and complexity, e.g.
,
dealing with organizational conflict as well as
specialization/ integration issues to achieve the required level of coor-
dination and cooperation. It was further pointed out in cases where
decentralization efforts did not yield expected results (e.g.
,
the health
agencies cited here) the requisite conditions a la the basic principles
were not given full and enthusiastic support by the executive group. It
would seem that any change in the organizational structure of the MHSS
would be motivated by the desire (on the part of DOD decision-makers)
to obtain a more efficient and cost-effective health care system. Thus

it is concluded that there must exist the endogenous and consistent in-
centives at all levels to provide the requisites for successful change
implementation.
The belief here is, given the ongoing research effort cited here
dealing with potential managerial improvements in the MHSS, that the
recommended regional management structure will provide the requisite
management and organizational level changes sufficient to ensure the
continued delivery of health care services to eligible DOD beneficiaries




Resource Programming in the Military Health Service System
Although the military medical departments are organized differently,
the programming of resources to support their activities is handled
similarly by all Services. In each Service the Surgeon General has
the major responsibility for developing and defending within his Service
and the Department of Defense, to OMB and before Congress, the majority
of his medical department's requirements for:
Military personnel.
Operation and maintenance (O&M) funds -- funds for civilian
personnel, supplies, equipment under $1, 000, contract services, and
other items.
Major construction monies -- funds for building and renovation
of facilities.
Procurement -- funds for equipment costing over $1,000.
Minor differences occur among Services in:
The extent to which certain health services delivery resources
are not identified with DOD Program 8 (training, medical, other per-
sonnel activities), but with other DOD programs, such as Programs 1
and 2 (strategic and general purpose forces), and thus do not come under
the program managership of the Surgeons General, all of whom are
Program 8 (medical) managers for their services.
The location of authority to allocate and expend health resources
once programmed.
In the Air Force virtually all health delivery resources are programmed
by the Surgeon General.* In the Army, the Surgeon General programs
*As of FY 1977 clinic operation previously not funded under Pro-
gram 8 (medical) will be identified with that program. The organic
medical components of strategic and tactical units may not be
brought into Program 8.




all medical department officer personnel and all resources for fixed
facilities worldwide. He does not program enlisted health services
personnel or O&M and procurement funds for mobile health service
delivery units (Forces Command medical units in the CONUS and organic
medical components of nonmedical field units overseas). In the Navy,
the Surgeon General programs the resources for the BuMed delivery-
system. He does not program the resources for the operating forces
system, and these represent a substantial portion of the total depart-
ment health delivery effort, including approximately 25 percent of the
health services manpower.
Authority to allocate and expend health services resources once they
are programmed varies in accordance with the command and control
structures outlined in the previous sections. This authority, however,
is circumscribed in all departments as follows:
-
-Operations and Maintenance (Medical) . O&M medical monies
can be used flexibly with funds shifted among the various categories of
resources included in the appropriation -- civilian personnel, supplies,
etc. The only constraint on use of these medical funds is that civilian
personnel ceilings, derived from Congressionally-set ceilings for each
service, cannot be breached.
O&M medical monies are "fenced" by Congress; no more than five per-
cent department-wide can be diverted to nonmedical O&M purposes.
Thus, commanders who receive O&M medical monies and other O&M
funds -- the major Army commands overseas, the major Air Force
commands -- cannot divert O&M medical monies to other O&M purposes
without departmental approval.
-- Major Construction . Congress authorizes and appropriates
construction funds for specific projects, and funds can only be used on
the projects for which they are appropriated.
Within these constraints, authority to allocate and expend health ser-
vices resources once they are appropriated is as follows:
Army
. Within the U.S. the commander, HSC, has the authority
to allocate and reallocate the military manpower authorizations and O&M
medical resources he receives from the Department of the Army within
his command, which encompasses both health care delivery in the United
States and the Army's health- related training and education.
Overseas, the medical commander's resource authority parallels that of
the commander, HSC. He controls military manpower authorizations and
O&M medical monies allocated to him by his major commander and can




The Surgeon General controls medical procurement funds, funds for
purchase of equipment over $1, 000 used in fixed facilities worldwide.
As noted above, the Surgeon General does not program enlisted health
services personnel or O&M and procurement funds to support health
service delivery in nonfixed facilities. These resources are program-
med by other Army managers and allocated to major Army commands.
The major Army commanders can allocate and expend these resources
as they see fit. Because these resources are not identified with Pro-
gram B (medical), they can be diverted to nonmedical purposes by the
major commanders.
All medical RDT&E resources are controlled by the Surgeon General,
as the medical Research and Development Command is a subordinate
command under his authority.
The Army Surgeon General also programs the O&M, construction and
procurement funds for those tri-service activities in support of the
direct care system for which he is the Executive Agent. Military man-
power requirements for these agencies generally are specified in the
charters of each agency.
Air Force . Military manpower authorizations and O&M medi-
cal funds are allocated to major commands by the Department of the
Air Force. Each major commander, with the advice and assistance of
his command surgeon, allocates these resources to the health services
activities under his command and control. Procurement funds are
centrally controlled and purchases of equipment over $1, 000 must be
approved by the Surgeon General.
Although health service activities are integrated into the Air Force
command structure, health services resources are not "integrated"
into a major command's total resources.
--The major command cannot divert O&M medical monies to
other O&M purposes within the command because Congress has fenced
these funds.
--Construction monies are earmarked for specific projects by
Congress.
--Procurement monies are controlled by the Surgeon General.
Thus, while a major commander can allocate and reallocate health
services resources among the health services activities under his com-
mand and control, in general he cannot "trade-off" health service and
other command activity resources.

As Executive Agent, the Air Force Surgeon General programs funding
for the Central Medical Registry.
Navy. Military manpower authorizations, O&M medical funds,
and procurement monies for the BuMed health services delivery system,
training and education and applied RDT&E are allocated and controlled
by the Navy Surgeon General as Chief of BuMed.
The Surgeon General does not program or control the resources of the
operating forces health care delivery system. These resources are
programmed by other Department of Navy managers and controlled by
the major operating force commanders. Because the O&M and procure-
ment monies which support the health services efforts of the operating
forces are not identified with Program 8 (medical), the major com-
manders can divert these funds to other uses as they see fit.
Although he does not program operating forces resources, the Surgeon
General, in his role as health care advisor to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and Commandant of the Marine Corps, can influence that system's
resource programming. Thus, for example, when a new class of ship
is commissioned, the Surgeon General can participate in determining
what military medical manpower resources are required to support the
ship's company. He also is responsible for preparing the health services
portion of the outfitting list which specifies the equipment required
aboard.
As Executive Agent, the Surgeon General programs resources for the
Defense Medical Material Board.
By DOD instruction all health facility construction appropria-
tion requests must be approved by the ASD(H&cE) prior to submission to
Congress. The ASD(H&E) must certify the need for construction of a
new facility or renovation of an existing one and approve the size and
capacity of the proposed facilities.
The ASD(H&E) is a member of the Manpower and Personnel
Council, established by the Secretary of Defense. The Council, com-
posed of Assistant Secretaries of Defense is responsible for developing
the All- Volunteer Force structure. In this forum the ASD(H&E), as
the OSD health services expert, has the opportunity to influence the




In addition to his staff responsibility, the ASD(H&E) provides policy-
guidance and has operational responsibility for the CHAMPUS* program.
This program is fully described in the study paper "Review of Champus
Management. "
The ASD(H&cE) is not responsible for development, coordination and
evaluation of DOD medical RDT&E policies and programs. The Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has that responsibility.
The DDR&E, as his title implies, has directive authority legislated by
Congress over research activities within the military departments. The
DDR&E, unlike the Assistant Secretaries overseeing other functional
areas, has authority to withhold funds from RDT&E activities. The
office of DDR&E, thus, has the authority to develop and implement policy
with regard to health sciences research and ensure that RDT&E resources
are used in accordance with the DOD- wide priorities he has set.
*CHAMPUS, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services, finances health care provided by civilian providers to DOD




Organization of the Army Medical Department
Department of the Army Organization . The Department of the Army
consists of the Office of the Secretary of the Army; the Army Staff,
headed by the Chief of Staff; and the 15 major Army commands which
report to the Chief of Staff and constitute the field organization of the
Army. The major commands headquartered in the continental United
States (CONUS) are organized functionally (for example, the Army
Material and Army Intelligence Commands). The major overseas com-
mands are organized geographically (e.g., the U. S. Army Europe).
Summary: Army Medical Department Organization . The Army Medical
Department is organized primarily along functional lines. Most health
services delivery -- services provided in fixed facilities -- both in the
United States and in geographical areas overseas is the responsibility
of dedicated health services commands. The balance -- services pro-
vided by field or mobile medical units --is provided by commands of
which the medical organizations are a part. Health services education
and training and health research and development are also the responsibil-
ity of dedicated commands.
The Surgeon General, through the commander of the Medical Research
and Development Command, commands and controls medical RDT&E
activities. Through the commander of the Health Services Command,
the Surgeon General also controls health service delivery in fixed
facilities in the U.S. ahd health education and training activities. He
does not command or control health services delivery activities of field
or mobile medical units in the U.S. or of the overseas medical commands,
He does have technical guidance over all Army Medical Department
activities and has direct access to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of
the Army on health and medical matters, including utilization of Army
Medical Department personnel.
HEALTH SERVICES DELIVERY
Command and Control . Army health services are delivered by two
types of organizations: those designed to function in fixed facilities
(permanent or semi-permanent structures) and those designed to function
in support of combat operations in nonfixed or field facilities.
Source: Military Health Care Study, Supplement, OMB/HEW/DOD,
p. 16-22, December 1975.

In the U.S., Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama, fixed -facility patient care
and ancillary support activities are under the command and control of
the commander, U. S. Army Health Services Command (HSC). HSC,
headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is a major Army command,
whose commander is responsible to the Army Chief of Staff. * Reporting
directly to the commander of the HSC are 33 subordinate Medical Depart-
ment Activity (MEDDAC) and 8 Medical Center commanders.
A MEDDAC provides health services in a defined geographical
area . It usually includes a hospital, whose commander also serves as
the MEDDAC commander, and outlying health facilities on installations
without hospitals. All health service activities operating out of fixed
facilities in the geographic area -- medical, dental and veterinary --
are assigned to the MEDDAC.
A Medical Center is also a medical command, similar to a
MEDDAC, which provides health services on a regional basis . Its major
component, however, is a sophisticated referral and teaching hospital
which provides specialized or tertiary care and supports MEDDAC and
overseas medical referrals.
All fixed health service delivery facilities in the U.S., thus, are under
the command of the MEDDAC or Medical Center commanders who in
turn are under the command and control of HSC.
All field or mobile health services units in the continental U.S. are under
the command and control of Forces Command. This major command is
comprised of all CONUS operating forces, forces whose primary mission
is to engage in combat.
Forces Command medical elements are of two types:
Field medical units are medical entities and in combat operate
nonfixed hospital facilities and their affiliated support services (e. g.
,
evacuation and combat support hospitals and air ambulance units support-
ing them). During peacetime these Forces Command units are in a
training or "nontreatment" status and typically have only two Medical
*The Army Chief of Staff has given the Surgeon General control of
HSC and the Surgeon General is responsible for direction and
supervision of its activities. The Surgeon General is the rating
or performance evaluation officer of the Commander of HSC and




Department officer staff assigned, a Medical Service Corps officer
who commands the unit and a training nurse. Specific physicians and
other professional staff working in HSC facilities are identified for
assignment to field medical units and in the event of contingency opera-
tions would deploy with the unit. Enlisted personnel assignments to
field medical units vary according to the units designated readiness
level, from fully staffed to two levels of reduced staffing.
Organic medical components of nonmedical field organizations
are medical elements within a combat unit such as a combat division or
infantry battalion. In combat these elements provide primary care and
prepare patients for evacuation to field medical units. In peacetime
these organic medical components customarily have a small number of
physicians assigned, with physician strength dependent upon the unit's
designated readiness level.
Forces Command medical personnel do not operate fixed facilities.
However, they receive technical training and maintain their skills by
working part time in MEDDAC and Medical Center facilities under
agreements between HSC and Forces Command. Thus, physicians
assigned to organic medical components of nonmedical field organiza-
tions often provide primary care (such as sick call) to the troops in
their organization for a portion of the day and work in the MEDDAC
the remainder.
Outside of the U.S., health services delivery in fixed facilities is also
functionally organized under medical commanders who exercise com-
mand and control over health services delivery resources within major
geographic regions. For example, in Europe there is a medical com-
mand comprised of 12 MEDDACs which provide health services within
specified geographic areas. Unlike HSC, which is a major Army com-
mand, however, the overseas medical commands are subordinate
rig
components of major Army commands. "r Thus, the medical commander
in Europe reports to the commander of the U. S. Army, Commander,
Korea.
Overseas, field medical units operate fixed facilities and thus are under
the command and control of the medical commander of the major Army
command. Organic medical components of nonmedical field units are
under the command and control of the combat organization of which they
are a part.
*The Department of the Army is being reorganized. Korea and
Japan are proposed major commands.
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Technical Guidance . Each major commander has a surgeon or
medical advisor on his staff. In the CONUS-based major commands,
the surgeon is a full-time counselor, responsible for advising the com-
mander and his staff on all health and medical matters pertaining to
the command and for participating in all planning activities dealing
with military operations. He recommends and supervises execution
of measures for prevention and control of diseases within the command;
provides staff coordination for dental, veterinary, and other medical
activities; plans and directs individual and unit training of medical
troops; advises the commander on training of nonmedical troops in
military sanitation and emergency medical treatment and provides staff
supervision over medical matters of the command. In the overseas
commands, the surgeon is generally dual-hatted, serving also as the
principal medical commander.
In the U.S. each installation commander has a designated medical staff
advisor or Director of Medical Activities (DMEDA). The DMEDA is a
physician operating within the HSC health services delivery system,
usually the MEDDAC commander. Both the installation commander and
the Health Services Command participate in rating the DMEDA's per-
formance, and he thus has an incentive to meet the requirements of
both. In Europe, MEDDAC commanders also serve as DMEDAs on
the staff of specified geographical area commanders.
Through the assignment of surgeons and dual-hatted DMEDAs, the
Army seeks to ensure that line commanders at all levels have the
medical advice they require and that the functionally-organized health
services delivery systems remain responsive to the commanders'
needs.
The Surgeon General has worldwide technical guidance over all Army
Medical Department activities. He can deal directly with surgeons of
major commands on matters relating to health services policy. The
surgeons in turn can deal directly with personnel in their commands
on health service policy matters. Use of these technical channels of
communication is common for information exchange, observation,
guidance on preferred methods of health delivery and similar activities.
Command channels generally are used when the health service matter
in question impinges upon the major commander's command pre-
rogatives (such as the use of health services personnel).
Commanders of health service delivery units at all echelons have
technical guidance over the military units they command. To assist
him in his technical guidance responsibilities, the commander of the
Health Services Command has designated the seven Medical Center
commanders as Army Regional Coordinators. In this role, the Medical
Center commanders are responsible for:
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Maintaining liaison with and providing technical guidance
through personal and staff consultations with fixed facility health care
activities within their assigned region.
Keeping the HSC commander informed on the status of health
care services in their region and making recommendations for improve-
ment in Army health care delivery.
The Army Regional Coordinator system is an intermediate structure
for providing technical guidance only. It is not an intermediate com-
mand and control structure.
Army Regionalization of Fixed Facilities . In the United States,
each of the three military medical departments has developed a
regionalized health care system. Within a specified geographical
area -- the seven HSC regions in the Army -- three levels of care are
provided. Primary or outpatient care in the Army is provided by HSC
clinics and hospital outpatient departments; secondary or routine in-
patient care for patients in their assigned geographical areas by the
MEDDAC hospitals and Medical Centers; and tertiary or highly
specialized care by the Medical Centers.
Overseas, Army health care is also regionalized in a general sense,
with specific facilities designated to provide only primary and/or
secondary care and others designated as specialized referral centers.
Within specific areas overseas, however, not all levels of care are
provided by any one service. As a rule, primary care is provided by
all services in all areas where their forces are stationed. Hospital
facilities, both smaller ones and the specialized referral centers,
however, often support the forces and other beneficiaries of all
services. In Europe and Okinawa, for example, the Army provides
specialized care to all services.
(The term regionalization is also used for a DOD-wide program
initiated in 1972. That program is explained in Appendix F. )
Education and Training . The Academy of Health Sciences, a sub-
ordinate component of HSC, is responsible for the Army's health-
related education programs for officers and enlisted personnel. The
Academy's programs range from basic medical training for enlisted
soldiers to post-doctoral medical specialty education and include
training in medical combat doctrine -- how medical units are organized
and operate to support combat forces. The Academy also programs
and monitors health services training of military personnel in civilian
institutions. The Surgeon General has control and technical guidance
authority over the Academy's operation and participates in rating the
performance of its commanding general.
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Research, Development, Test and Evaluation . The Medical Research
and Development Command, a subordinate command of the Surgeon Gen-
eral, is responsible for all Army medical RDT&E. The commander of
the Research and Development Command also serves as the Assistant
Surgeon General for Research and Development and thus is responsible




Organization of the Air Force Medical Department
Department of the Air Force Organization . The Department of the Air
Force is composed of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; the
Air Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff; and 15 major commands and 10
separate operating agencies which constitute the field organization of
the Air Force. The major commands, comprised of operating forces
or forces whose primary mission is to engage in combat, are organized
on a functional basis in the continental U.S. (e.g. , Strategic Air Com-
mand, Military Airlift Command) and on a geographical basis overseas
(for example, the Air Forces in Europe and the Pacific Air Forces).
The separate operating agencies perform staff support functions which
cut across all of the commands (e.g., Military Personnel Center).
While the major commands operate bases or installations, the separate
operating agencies do not: they are tenants on major command
installations.
Summary: Air Force Medical Service Organization. Health services
in the Air Force are integrated into the Air Force field organization:
all health activities are subordinate elements of the 15 major Air Force
commands and are under the command and control of major commanders.
The Surgeon General is a staff advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force
and Air Force Chief of Staff and has technical guidance authority over all
Air Force medical department activities.
HEALTH SERVICES DELIVERY
Command and Control . The health services delivery resources
which support the major commands are integral to them, and command
and control of health services delivery is through the major command
channels. Units of the Air Force separate operating agencies are
tenants on major command installations, and the major commands pro-
vice health services support to tenant agency personnel.
Each Air Force installation has a Director of Base Medical Services
who controls all health service activities -- medical, dental, veterinary
-- assigned or attached to the base. The Director of Base Medical
Source: Military Health Care Study, Supplement, OMB/HEW/DOD,
p. 23-28, December 1975.
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Services normally reports to the installation commander who in turn
reports to the commander of his major command.
A few medical resources on some installations are' not under the control
of the Director of Base Medical Services. Strategic and tactical units
worldwide have small organic medical components, usually a flight
surgeon and two technicians, which go with the unit when it is deployed.
In cases where the flight line is close to the base medical facilities,
these personnel may be assigned to the Director of Base Medical
Services. Where the flight line is some distance from base medical
facilities, these units may remain under the control of the unit
commanders. In those instances where organic medical components
remain under the command and control of tactical and strategic com-
manders, they generally provide primary care to their unit's personnel
part of the day (e. g. , hold routine sick call) and work in base medical
facilities the remainder. As the supply of Air Force physicians has
decreased, control of organic medical units increasingly has been
assigned to the Director of Base Medical Services. As a matter of
policy, the unit commanders rate the flight surgeons organic to their
command, including assessment material from the Director of Base
Medical Services . In practice, the situation is often reversed, with
the Director of Base Medical Services rating the physician with input
from the unit commander.
Technical Guidance. To assist him in managing health services
delivery in his command, each major commander has a command
surgeon on his staff. The Surgeon General can communicate directly
with command surgeons on health policy matters. The Surgeon General
does not use technical channels to handle health- related matters which
impinge upon the major commander's command prerogatives: com-
munication of this kind follows regular command channels.
The command surgeon in each major command has the authority to
provide technical guidance directly to Directors of Base Medical
Services.
Air Force Regionalization of Fixed Facilities . In the United States,
health service delivery is regionalized under the Air Force hospital
*In a few instances there is an intermediate level commander to
whom the installation commander reports. In those cases where
the Director of Base Medical Services and installation commander
are the same rank, both report to the same higher level commander,
usually the commander of their major command.
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system. Under this system the CONUS is divided into six geographic
areas, each served by a tertiary care hospital called an Area Medical
Center. Each geographic area is further subdivided into regions, and
each region is served by a secondary care facility, the Regional Hospital.
Primary care is provided by small base hospitals and clinics. In addi-
tion to serving as teaching hospitals and referral centers for less special-
ized facilities, the Area Medical Centers and regional hospitals provide
consultant support to their respective areas and regions.
Overseas health service delivery is regionalized on both an intra- and
tri-service basis, as noted above under the section on Army regionaliza-
tion of fixed facilities.
Education and Training. Three major commands have primary
responsibility for education and training of Air Force Medical Depart-
ment personnel. The School of Health Care Sciences of the Air Force
Training Command provides most of the training for enlisted personnel,
both technical training and basic courses in Air Force health services
organization and management. The Academy also conducts basic orienta-
tion and management courses for Air Force medical department officers.
Training for flight surgeons, flight nurses and aerospace physiologists
and for the technicians who support them is conducted at the School of
Aerospace Medicine which is part of the Aerospace Medical Division of
the Air Force Systems Command (see section on RDT&E). The School
also provides most of the Air Forces advanced technical-professional
training and education in specialty areas such as veterinary and pre-
ventive medicine, bioenvironmental engineering, optometry and
dentistry.
Military personnel doing sponsored graduate and post-graduate work in
civilian institutions come under the command of, and their progress is
monitored by, the Air Force Institute of Technology. The Institute is
part of the Air University, a major Air Force command.
Each of these major commands has a command surgeon who has tech-
nical guidance authority over the health service education and training
activities within the command. The Surgeon General has technical
guidance authority over the health services education and training
activities of all three.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation . All medical RDT&E
is the responsibility of the Aerospace Medicine Division of the Air Force
Systems Command. The Systems Command is a major command respon-
sible for advancing aerospace technology and adapting it to operational
aerospace systems. As with other health service activities, the com-




Organization of the Navy Medical Department
Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy is comprised of
the Navy Department, which includes the Office of the Secretary of the
Navy and the executive functions of the Navy and Marine Corps, under
the command of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the
Marine Corps, respectively: the shore establishment: and the operating
forces.
The operating forces of the Navy and Marine Corps are combat forces or
forces afloat, such as the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The shore estab-
lishment of the Department of the Navy, as its name implies
,
includes
the land-based activities of the Navy and Marine Corps, the primary
purpose of which is to support the operating forces. In the Navy, the
shore establishment consists largely of functional commands (such as
the Naval Intelligence Command and Naval Weather Service). The shore
establishment of the Marine Corps is called the Supporting Establishment.
Its responsibilities include maintenance of the permanent basis on which
Marines are garrisoned or housed when they are not deployed.
Summary: Organization of the Navy Medical Department . Health ser-
vices delivery in the Navy is organized into two systems, a worldwide
shore-based system which is functionally organized and an operating
forces system which is integrated into the command and control struc-
tures of those forces. The Navy Surgeon General commands and con-
trols the shore-based health service delivery system, most health-
related training and education and applied health sciences RDT&E.
Basic health sciences research is the responsibility of the Office of
Naval Research.
HEALTH SERVICES DELIVERY
Command and Control . There are two basic health services delivery
systems in the Navy.
Source: Military Health Care Study, Supplement, OMB/HEW/DOD,
p. 29-35, December 1975.

§hore-based or fixed facilities world wide are under the
command and control of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Chief
of which is the Navy Surgeon General.
Facilities of the operating forces -- forces comprised of
ships, airplanes, Fleet Marine Forces -- are integrated into the com-
mand and control structure of these forces.
Medical facilities in the shore-based or Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
(BuMed) system are organized on a geographical basis. Under this sys-
tem of Navy Medical Regions, all of the medical care delivery resources
within a given region are under the command and control of a Regional
Medical Director who reports to the Chief of BuMed (The Navy Surgeon.
General). A Medical Region generally includes a Medical Center and/or
Navy hospital(s) and several branch dispensaries. In regions including
a Medical Center, the commander of the Center serves as Regional
Medical Director. In others, a hospital commander is designated
Regional Director. A similar regionalized organization exists for dental
care delivery and the Dental Regional Directors also report directly to
BuMed. ^ Four environmental health and preventive medicine units and
two disease vector control centers which serve the Navy and Marine
Corps worldwide are not regionalized. The officers in charge of these
organizational units also report directly to BuMed.
Health delivery resources in the operating forces are integrated into the
command and control structure of those forces. The Commanders in
Chief Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have command and control of the health
delivery resources of ships and aircraft in their respective Fleets.
Command and control below the Fleet level, however, are split between
type commanders and numbered fleet commanders. The type commanders
each command specific categories of forces, i.e., submarine forces,
amphibious forces, air forces, mine forces, cruiser-destroyer forces,
•JL. «b J*
service (support) forces, and Fleet Marine Forces. 'I"'"r'
^Currently most but not all fixed facilities are under BuMed com-
mand. Most of those which are not are in the process of being
transferred to the BuMed system.
**Dental regionalization has just begun. To date two dental regions
have been established.
*##The Fleet Marine Forces vary from the other type commands in that
their chain of command is to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
not the Chief of Naval Operations. Thus, the type commanders of the
Fleet Marine Forces are members of the Marine Corps and receive
their resources from the Commandant. As part of the Atlantic and




When these forces are deployed, however, they are under the control
of the numbered fleet commanders, the commanders of the Third and
Seventh Fleets in the Pacific and the Second and Sixth Fleets in the
Atlantic. Basically, the type commanders in each Fleet, Atlantic and
Pacific, are the providers of resources and the numbered fleet com-
manders are the users of resources.
The Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe does not command
operating force resources but controls those made available to him
from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet type commanders. (The Military
Sealift Command, which transports people and cargo in support of all
services, consists of civil service-manned and commercial ships under
contract and has military health services personnel assigned only to
its headquarters for technical guidance and contingency planning
purposes.
)
When not deployed, health services personnel of the operating forces
may work in the fixed facilities of the BuMed system. As a rule they
do so under informal agreements made by the Regional Medical or
Dental Directors and senior commanders of the operating forces present
in the region. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of
Naval Operations formally have agreed that virtually all physicians and
other medical personnel assigned to Marine Corps operating forces
will come under the control of the Regional Medical Director when
those forces are in garrison at Camp Pendleton. A similar agreement
is now being negotiated for Camp Lejuene. (These two agreements
formally will tie most of the medical department officers assigned to
the Fleet Marine Forces into the BuMed regional system: only a few
Marine air wing medical department personnel will continue to work in
regional facilities under informal, local agreements. )
Technical Guidance . In the shore-based BuMed system, medical
and dental officers in charge of health care facilities on an installation
are assigned additional duty as staff advisers to the installation com-
mander, thereby ensuring he has the technical guidance he needs and
that health services delivery is responsive to the needs of his instal-
lation. (The installation commanders, however, do not participate in
rating the performance of the medical and dental officers. )
In the operating forces system, each major command -- the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets, U. S. Naval Forces Europe and the Military Sea-
lift Command -- has a command surgeon and a dental officer who have
technical guidance authority over all health service units within the
command. In addition, within the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, each
type commander is assigned a staff surgeon and a staff dentist, the
force medical and dental officers, and each numbered fleet commander
has a staff medical and a staff dental officer. The force medical and
99

dental officers have technical guidance authority over all health service
units within their type commander's forces. The numbered fleet staff
medical and dental officers have technical guidance authority over all
health service units deployed to their fleets. When deployed to a num-
bered fleet, thus, health service unit commanders are subject to tech-
nical guidance from 3 sources: the major command surgeon and dental
officers; the force medical and dental officers and the numbered fleet
staff medical and dental officers.
The Surgeon General has technical guidance authority over all health
service delivery activities of the Navy. He can deal directly with major
command surgeons through technical channels. As in the Air Force the
Surgeon General goes through command channels when his guidance im-
pinges upon command prerogatives.
The Surgeon General also provides technical guidance to the Commandant
of the Marine Corps. In addition, the Commandant has a staff medical
and a staff dental adviser assigned to him by the Navy. The Medical
Officer and Dental Officer of the Marine Corps are dual-hatted, and
also serve as Special Assistants to the Surgeon General for Marine
Corps affairs.
Navy Regionalization of Fixed Facilities . As in the Army and Air
Force, Navy fixed facilities in the U.S. are regionalized. Primary
care is provided by BuMed branch dispensaries and outpatient facilities
of hospitals. Secondary or routine inpatient care is provided by BuMed
hospitals and Medical Centers to beneficiaries within their geographical
area of responsibility. Specialized or tertiary care is provided by the
Medical Centers.
Overseas, the health service delivery system is regionalized on both
an intra- and tri-service basis as explained in "Army Regionalization
of Fixed Facilities. "
Training and Education. Health services technical, professional
and managerial education, ranging from training of hospital corpsmen
and dental technicians to post-graduate specialty education is primarily
the responsibility of BuMed. The Bureau operates eight schools, a
Health Care Administration at Bethesda, Maryland; an Aerospace
Medical Institute in Pensacola, Florida; a Naval Undersea Medical
Institute in Groton, Connecticut; two Hospital Corps Schools, one at
Great Lakes, Illinois, and the other in San Diego, California; and a
Dental Technician School also in San Diego. BuMed also programs




Two field medicine schools, designed to train Navy personnel for assign-
ment with the Marine Corps, are funded and operated by the Marine
Corps.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. Responsibility for
health sciences research is divided between BuMed and the Office of
Naval Research (ONR). The Office of Naval Research, a line office
under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development,
has primary responsibility for basic health sciences research. BuMed





Regionalization of peacetime military health services support, known as
Tri-Service Regionalization, was tested in four areas between May 1972
and May 1973, and initiated CONUS wide in October 1973. The objec-
tives of this program are as follows:
To encourage and assist the military medical departments in
the establishment of a formal regional cooperative system to improve
inter-Service health planning and delivery of health services at all
levels
.
To improve the delivery of health services to all active duty
military personnel and other eligible beneficiaries.
To assure delivery of comprehensive health services without
interference with existing command relations, budgeting, and program-
ming systems or Service identification of personnel and facilities.
To provide for a cooperative arrangement which will afford
the latest advances in diagnosis and treatment and greater opportunity
for clinical investigation and continuing education of health services
personnel.
To eliminate or reduce those health services and associated
resources existing, planned, or programmed which cannot be fully
justified by the total Department of Defense workload or an overriding
military operational program.
To date, the program has been directed principally toward discovering
areas where cooperative inter-Service arrangements could be initiated
to improve the overall management of MHSS resources. Several admin-
istrative procedures have been reviewed to determine specific areas
which offer potential for improvement. Typical of these activities
include the following:
Revision of Department of Defense and Service directives to
standardize health service terms and definitions.




Development of a directive requiring a data base with which
to compare length-of-stay statistics to measure progress in utilization
review.
Development of a plan for the formulation and implementation
of a regionalized military blood program.
Granting of a contract to conduct a feasibility study on a
Department of Defense patient enrollment system.
There is some evidence that the Service medical facilities at the re-
gional level are better utilizing resources and are exploring the poten-
tial for more complete utilization of health services. In general,
managers in Tri-Service regions have not clearly demonstrated the
potential benefits of the program. The review of bed occupancy data
on a facility basis, previously mentioned, suggests there may be excess
beds in a number of facilities. For example, many facilities have bed
occupancy rates significantly below the 80-85 percent level that is gen-
erally accepted as optimum for effective use of total resources.
Although the regionalization concept has been in effect a relatively short
period of time it appears that much remains to be done before it makes
significant progress toward achievement of its objectives. Further
progress may require strengthening this concept by giving regional
authorities the responsibility for oversight of health care delivery in





In October 1973, following a nine-month test in four geographical areas,
a DOD regionalization program, conceived by the ASD(H&E) and developed
with the cooperation of the three military medical departments, was
instituted in CONUS. The basic purpose of the program is to bring the
three separate service systems into closer conjunction by establishing
a formal mechanism for regional cooperation. Specific goals of the
program are to:
Improve the planning and delivery of health care services to all
DOD beneficiaries.
Advance opportunities for clinical investigation and continuing
education of health services personnel.
Eliminate or reduce health services and associated resources --
existing, planned or programmed -- which cannot be fully justified by
the total DOD workload or an overriding military operational program.
Under the plan, 13 CONUS regions have been established. Within each
a tri-service Regional Review Committee composed of a hospital/
medical center commander from each service, designated by their
Surgeons General, has been established. The Review Committees meet
regularly to assess their region's capability and resource requirements
and identify areas in which cooperative efforts can enhance their health
services delivery. The Regional Review Committees report quarterly
to the Military Medical Regional Coordinating Office, composed of the
Surgeons General and ASD(H&E).
Cooperation is the cornerstone of tri-service regionalization. Existing
command relationships, service programming and budgeting systems
and service identification of personnel and facilities are not changed
under the program. Persuasion and logic are the major tools available
to the Review Committee members to influence each other and the other
facility commanders within their regions.
The narrative reports submitted during the test phase and first quarter
of the program provide some measure of the impact of tri-service re-
gionalization to date:
Source: Military Health Care Study, Supplement, OMB/HEW/DOD,
p. 43-45, December 1975
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Quality of care . The reports cite no specific evidence that
quality of care has improved. However, ASD(H&:E) notes that there is
reason to believe that efforts to appraise quality lead automatically to
improvement in care and indicates that greater emphasis will be placed
on trying to measure quality of care in the future.
Resource economy . Reports cite some specific examples of
economies in resource use, such as sharing of specialty services.
Patient waiting periods. There has been no evidence of in-
creased or decreased waiting periods for specific services. However,
sharing of specialty services has made additional care available to some
patients for the first time.
Evacuation patterns. Regionalization has made expansion of
the current patient regulating system possible. The services, in con-
junction with the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office, are
developing a system under which all CONUS hospital patients will be
centrally regulated. Under this system a patient will be regulated to
a facility outside of his home region only if he requires specialized
care not available in the region, medical education and clinical investi-
gation programs would be supported by his extra-regional transfer or
other military regulations dictate such a transfer
Resource reallocations . No mechanism is available to effect
reallocation of resources at the regional level. Action at the depart-
mental level is required to implement locally-developed innovations.
Expansion/discontinua nce of clinical services . Reports cite
specific examples, most of which deal with expansion of care provided
through sharing of specialty services.
Medical education/clinical investigation . Tri-Service Regional-
ization is a factor in influencing the medical services to re-evaluate their
teaching programs both as to size and number. Communication and coop-
eration among the three services has improved. ASD(H&E) sees con-
tinued emphasis as necessary in this area, particular to help ensure
the integrity of the proposed centralized patient regulation system.
Consumer satisfaction . The reports cite no negative patient
reaction to regionalization. Patients' response has been positive where
additional services have been established (e. g. , at remote Air Force




Line commanders response. The reports cite no evidence that
installation and other commanders feel regionalization has adversely-
affected the care provided to their forces.
As noted in previous sections, there traditionally has been a substantial
degree of informal tri-service cooperation in overseas areas. Tests to
determine the value of formalizing this cooperation through establishment
of Regional Review Committees in Europe and Japan also have been com-





Major Findings of the Military Health Care Study (MHCS)l
In general, the study determined that the MHSS provides a broad spec-
trum of relatively effective and efficient health care services to more
than nine million entitled beneficiaries. In addition, experience has
clearly demonstrated the unique capability of the MHSS to respond to
military and civil emergencies. However, the study has concluded
that a number of opportunities exist to improve MHSS efficiency and
effectiveness while maintaining the delivery of quality care to entitled
beneficiaries.
Specific findings are summarized in the following sections:
Resource Requirements
1. Relatively little change in the MHSS beneficiary population
size and entitlement composition will occur between 1975 and 1990.
2. Only small increases in demand for CONUS health services are
projected between 1975 and 1990.
3. Volunteer physician accessions must increase above the FY 1975
level of 454 to meet future demand for health care services, assuming
a range of physician retention rates and no changes in physician pro-
ductivity, beneficiary utilization, or graduate medical education
programs.
4. Used as a physician manpower forecasting tool, the resource
model projects that physician supply will not fall below 10, 000 active
duty physicians through 1990.
This assumes an initial active duty physician level of
11,664 with 500 annual civilian accessions (approximately the number
in FY 1975), and any retention or Graduate Medical Education program
growth scenario studied.
All retention rates used in the model were set higher than
previous experience, anticipating increased retention due to Variable
Incentive Pay (VIP).




Planning, Management and Evaluation
1. Planning for military health care delivery in CONUS is prin-
cipally based on historical workload and population projections rather
than population-based forecasts of total demand.
This, together with other factors such as uncertainties
about accessions, strength levels and transfers, results in overprogram-
ming of beds.
2. The incentives in workload-based programming may encourage
relatively heavy use of inpatient care.
The MHSS and the fee-for-service civilian sector have
higher hospital utilization than the capitation-based Kaiser system.
However, selected indicators suggest that quality of mili-
tary health care is generally comparable with that in Kaiser and other
civilian facilities.
3. Kaiser enrollees use more in-system outpatient services than
MHSS nonactive duty beneficiaries; when estimates of out-of-system use
in both the MHSS and Kaiser are added to in-system rates, overall rates
in the two systems are roughly comparable.
4. A study of 13 selected diagnoses showed that hospital lengths
of stay for each of the Services tend to be longer than those for com-
parable patients hospitalized with the same selected diagnoses in the
civilian sector.
Nonactive duty patient stays for each of the military depart-
ments were longer than stays for 12 of 13 diagnoses in Kaiser hospitals;
stays were longer for 5 diagnoses, but shorter for only 1, than in PAS
hospitals
.
Patients hospitalized under CHAMPUS experienced shorter
lengths of stay for 7 of 13 diagnoses than those for each of the military
departments; CHAMPUS stays were longer for 2 diagnoses.
Active duty patient stays varied widely among the Service
hospitals and were almost always longer than nonactive duty stays for
the same diagnoses.
5. Planning and programming for the direct care system independent
of CHAMPUS is inefficient, resulting in substantial over- or under-
estimates of CHAMPUS requirements.
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6. The Tri-Service regionalization program has not yet achieved
its potential for maximizing the use of cooperative arrangements and
improving the management of Service resources.
7. Management of selected highly specialized (tertiary) care is
not well coordinated.
Some military medical facilities providing highly specialized
care may not fully utilize all capability for certain medical procedures.
Relatively large proportions of patients requiring the
highly specialized care selected for study are transferred to facilities
of their own Service rather than the closest military facility capable of
providing that care.
DOD utilization standards have not been developed for most
of the high cost, special purpose services and equipment studied. More-
over, there are few generally accepted standards within the civilian
community for these services and equipment.
8. The MHSS is handicapped by lack of adequate population, work-
load, and cost data and comparable information systems for the military
departments
.
Military Health Care Costs
1. The total cost of CONUS military health care delivery in FY 1974
was calculated to be $2, 097 billion.
This includes costs for direct care in fixed facilities,
CHAMPUS, CHAMPUS handicapped, and care of active duty personnel
in non-Service facilities.
2. There is a wide range of costs for nonactive duty beneficiaries
in direct care and CHAMPUS facilities.
3. An aggregate cost model analysis suggests that the cost of most
care delivery alternatives may be greater than the cost of providing care
through the direct care portion of the MHSS.
In general, some savings would be expected from moving
small amounts of work from CHAMPUS to military medical facilities.
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However, analysis of individual medical facility cost data
indicates that some military medical facilities have costs which exceed
the local CHAMPUS price for care. Consequently, some savings might
be expected from small shifts in care to CHAMPUS from these facilities.
Additional costs would be expected from large shifts of
care now provided in military medical facilities to CHAMPUS.
Total system cost could be expected to increase if substan-
tial numbers of nonactive duty beneficiaries (including active duty depend-
ents, retired and their dependents, and survivors) were contracted to
alternative health care programs, such as the high option Blue Cross/
Blue Shield or Kaiser in Northern and Southern California. Total cost
would also increase if only retired and their dependents were contracted
to alternative plans. These findings assume premium rates charged to
civilian Federal employees for those plans in FY 1974, and that prepaid
plans must be purchased for all currently entitled beneficiaries, although
some of these do not use the MHSS.
Military Health Care as a Benefit
1. The majority of MHSS beneficiaries evidence general satisfaction
with their health care.
2. Nonactive duty beneficiaries get most of their outpatient and
about half of their inpatient care from military facilities.
3. CHAMPUS and direct care benefits for all eligibles, combined
with the military retiree's unique "space-available" eligibility for care
in VA medical facilities, create an attractive benefit package for bene-





Recommendations of the Military Health Care Study (MHSS)
The study proposes a number of changes in current DOD policies and
organization for military health care delivery. These recommendations,
developed after careful consideration of study findings, were structured
as broad concepts of management and organization rather than a detailed
list of improvements. Because they are intended to provide long-term
guidance for MHSS operations, these concepts should create a frame-
work within which details of management and organization can be adapted
to changing requirements and circumstances within and outside of DOD.
1. National security mobilization, contingency and other essential
force requirements should be the primary determinant of the size and
composition of the peacetime military medical force; additions should be
made to that force when:
Adequate health care facilities for beneficiaries are not
available overseas or at underserved locations.
A valid teaching or training requirement is being met.
The marginal cost to provide quality care in military
facilities is less per beneficiary than nonmilitary alternatives.
2. A central entity within DOD, serving as a coordinating mech-
anism for planning and allocating resources, should be established to
oversee health care delivery in CONUS.
3. Oversight of health care delivery operations should be assigned
to regional authorities responsible for all health care delivery in their
CONUS geographical areas.
4. MHSS health care delivery planning for CONUS should be pri-
marily based on the size and demographic characteristics of the popula-
tion to be served.
5. Resource programming and budgeting for the MHSS in CONUS
should be done on a capitation basis.
Source: Military Health Care Study, Final Report, OMB/HEW/DOD,
December 1975, p. 8-9.
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6. Resource programming for the direct care system and CHAMPUS
should be integrated within DOD.
7. Costs per beneficiary should be developed and used as a measure
of efficiency and performance.
8. Programs to control inpatient utilization in military medical
facilities should be established.
9. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of allowing depend-
ents of active duty members, retiree families and survivor families to
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